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Unlocking Access to Health
Care: A Federalist Approach to
Reforming Occupational
Licensing
Gabriel Scheffler1
Abstract
Several features of the existing occupational licensing system
impede access to health care without providing appreciable protections
for patients. Licensing restrictions prevent health care providers from
offering services to the full extent of their competency, obstruct the
adoption of telehealth, and deter foreign-trained providers from
practicing in the United States. Scholars and policymakers have
proposed a number of reforms to this system over the years, but these
proposals have had a limited impact for political and institutional
reasons.
Still, there are grounds for optimism. In recent years, the federal
government has taken a range of initial steps to reform licensing
requirements for health care providers, and these steps have the
potential to improve access to health care. Together, they illustrate a
federalist approach to licensing reform, in which the federal government
encourages the states to reform their licensing regimes, while largely
preserving states’ control over the system. These steps include: (1)
easing federal licensing restrictions for health care providers in certain
areas where the federal government possesses regulatory authority; (2)
creating incentives for states and professional bodies to experiment with
reforms; (3) intensifying the Federal Trade Commission’s focus on
licensing boards’ anti-competitive conduct; and (4) generating
additional pressure for state-level reforms through expanding health
insurance and promoting delivery system reforms under the Affordable
Care Act.
This article argues that a federalist approach represents the most
promising path toward reforming occupational licensing in health care.
Federal intervention in licensing is necessary, due to states’ lack of
1.
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incentives to experiment with licensing reforms, the externalities of
their licensing regimes, and their inability to resolve their own collective
action problems. Nevertheless, large-scale federal preemption of state
licensing laws is unlikely, due to a combination of interest group
politics, Congress’s tendency toward incrementalism, and its reliance
on the states to administer federal policies. A federalist approach also
has functional advantages over outright federal preemption: it allows
for more experimentation in constructing new licensing regimes, and it
enables the federal government to take advantage of states’
institutional expertise in regulating occupations. Finally, this approach
presents a model for how the federal government can play a constructive
role in occupational licensing in other fields besides health care, and in
other areas of state regulatory policy.

Contents
Introduction .................................................................................. 295
I.

Licensing and Its Origins ........................................................ 303
A. Structure and Function .................................................................303
B. History ........................................................................................304
C. Legal Authority and Policy Justifications ........................................306

II.

The Impact of Licensing on Access to Health Care ............. 310
A. Scope of Practice ..........................................................................313
B. Telehealth ....................................................................................315
C. Foreign-Trained Providers ............................................................319

III. A Federalist Approach .......................................................... 321
A. Federal Licensing Changes ............................................................322
B. Fiscal Support ..............................................................................324
C. Antitrust Remedies .......................................................................327
D. The Affordable Care Act ...............................................................332
IV. The Inadequacy of Alternative Approaches ......................... 336
A. Alternative Reform Proposals ........................................................337
1. State Reform Proposals ................................................................. 337
2. Federal Reform Proposals ............................................................. 338
B. The Need for Federal Intervention .................................................340
1. Experimentation ............................................................................ 342
2. Externalities .................................................................................. 344
3. Collective Action ........................................................................... 346
C. Federalism Versus Federal Preemption ...........................................347
1. Interest Group Politics .................................................................. 347
2. Incrementalism and State Administration..................................... 350
V. Conclusion ................................................................................. 353

294

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming
Occupational Licensing

Introduction
Occupational licensing has been enjoying something of a
renaissance of late. After a number of years in which scholars and
policymakers paid scant attention to licensing,2 there has been a
noticeable surge in government initiatives and scholarly work focused
on licensing in recent years.3 To name a few recent developments: the
Senate held a hearing on occupational licensing and antitrust doctrine
in 2016;4 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) formed an “Economic
Liberty Taskforce” in 2017, which has focused in large part on
licensing;5 the Supreme Court in 2015 held that state licensing boards
are not automatically immune from federal antitrust scrutiny,6 leading
several states to restructure their licensing systems;7 both the Trump
Administration and the Obama Administration have publicly discussed
the harms of licensing;8 and prominent media outlets, such as the New
York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and National Public Radio have
featured stories on licensing.9
2.

Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 18990 (2000) (“[E]ven though occupational licensing has historically been
among the most examined institutions in labor economics, this institution
has received relatively little recent attention, either from academics or the
public policy press.”).

3.

See, e.g., Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational
Licensing Boards Up Close, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (2017) (“[A]
movement against wasteful occupational licensing rules and regulations is
gaining steam.”); Ryan Nunn, The Future of Occupational Licensing
Reform, BROOKINGS (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/
opinions/the-future-of-occupational-licensing-reform/ (describing how “an
increasingly broad array of stakeholders and policymakers have indicated
a desire to reform occupational licensing”).

4.

License to Compete: Occupational Licensing and the State Action
Doctrine Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy &
Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016),
available
at
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/license-tocompete-occupational-licensing-and-the-state-action-doctrine.

5.

FTC Launches New Website Dedicated to Economic Liberty, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2017/03/ftc-launches-new-website-dedicated-economic-liberty.

6.

N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015).

7.

See infra Part III C.

8.

DEP’T TREASURY OFF. ECON. POL’Y, THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS,
AND THE DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR
POLICYMAKERS (2015) [hereinafter WH REPORT]; THE COUNCIL OF ECON.
ADVISERS, THE GROWTH POTENTIAL OF DEREGULATION (2017).

9.

See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Moving to Arizona Soon? You Might Need a
License, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/06/18/business/economy/job-licenses.html; Jacob Goldstein, Why
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This resurgence of interest in licensing is warranted. Recent data
suggest that roughly one-quarter of the workforce in the United States
is licensed.10 Workers in licensed professions must obtain permission
from the government—generally the state government, though some
professions are licensed by the federal government or local
governments11—to be granted the legal authority to work in their
chosen field.12 To obtain a license, applicants typically must prove that
they meet certain education and training standards, pass an
examination, pay a fee to the licensing board, and fulfill other
administrative requirements.13
A growing body of empirical research finds that the current
licensure system imposes substantial economic burdens on workers and
consumers.14 Most licensing restrictions are set not by disinterested

It’s Illegal to Braid Hair Without a License, NPR (June 12, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/sections/money/2012/06/21/154826233/whyits-illegal-to-braid-hair-without-a-license; see e.g., Josh Zumbrun,
Occupational Licenses May Be Bad for the Economy, But Good for
Workers Who Have Them, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2016, 1:13 PM),
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/04/18/occupational- licensesmay-be-bad-for-the-economy-but-good-for-workers-who-have- them/.
10.

See Jason Furman & Laura Giuliano, New Data Show that One-Quarter
of U.S. Workers Hold an Occupational License, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL
OF ECON. ADVISERS BLOG (June 17, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/blog/2016/06/17/new-data-show-roughly-one-quarter-usworkers-hold-occupational-license; Data on Certifications and Licenses,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/cps/certificationsand-licenses.htm#highlights (last modified Jan. 18, 2019).

11.

Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence
of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31(2) J. LAB. ECON. S173,
S184 (2013) [hereinafter Kleiner & Krueger, Labor Market] (reporting the
results of a survey on the licensure status of around 2,500 individuals that
“about two-thirds of the licensed individuals in our sample are licensed at
the state level, followed by the federal and local levels”).

12.

The term occupational licensing generally “encompasses all forms of
regulation that give the licensed practitioner the legal authority to engage
in his occupation or profession.” BENJAMIN SHIMBERG ET AL.,
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRAC. & POL’Y 8, 9. (1972). This contrasts
with certification, which is “a nongovernmental mechanism for granting
recognition to certain individuals within an occupation or profession.”

13.

See BENJAMIN SHIMBERG,
PERSPECTIVE 25-31 (1980).

14.

According to one rough “back-of-the-envelope” calculation, licensing in
the U.S. results in up to 2.85 million fewer jobs nationwide, with an annual
cost to consumers of $203 billion. Morris Kleiner et al., A Proposal to
Encourage States to Rationalize Occupational Licensing Practices (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, 2011) (unpublished proposal to the Brookings
Institution Hamilton Project) [hereinafter Kleiner, A Proposal]; MORRIS
KLEINER, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING POLICIES 6 (2015),

OCCUPATIONAL
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regulators, but rather by members of licensed professions who have an
economic incentive to erect regulatory barriers that limit competition
and deliver “economic rents”—profits that exceed what would exist in
a competitive market.15 Licensing results in higher wages for licensed
workers, but reduces employment and wages for unlicensed workers,
creates higher prices for consumers, and limits access to services.16
Empirical research also strongly suggests that licensing reduces
geographic mobility.17 Workers in licensed professions typically must be
licensed in each state in which they practice, and states often impose
varying requirements to obtain and maintain a license, making it more
difficult for workers to relocate from one state to another. 18 These costs
are disproportionately borne by certain groups, such as immigrants and
individuals with criminal records.19
available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
THP_KleinerDiscPaper_final.pdf.
15.

Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, Transcript of
Speech at the Brookings Institution on Occupational Licensing and
Economic
Rents
at
1
(Nov.
2,
2015),
available
at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/201
51102_occupational_licensing_and_economic_rents.pdf.
But
see
Sandeep Vaheesan & Frank Pasquale, The Politics of Professionalism:
Reappraising Occupational Licensure and Competition Policy, ANN. REV.
L. SOC. SCI. 309, 322 (2018) (arguing that “[b]y restricting entry,
occupational and professional regulations establish market shelters that
enhance the bargaining power of workers, raising wages and improving
worker welfare.”).

16.

See, e.g., WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (reviewing the empirical
literature on the impacts of licensing on the labor market, and finding
that licensing restrictions lead to prices that are 3 to 16 percent higher,
that licensed workers earn 10 to 15 percent more than unlicensed workers
studies with similar levels of education and training, and that licensing
reduces interstate mobility).

17.

See, e.g., id. at 15 (finding that “there are substantial differences in the
likelihood of moving across State lines between workers in highly licensed
occupations versus other workers, while there are only modest differences
between the two groups in the likelihood of moving within a State”);
Morris S. Kleiner et al., Barriers to Labor Migration: The Case of
Occupational Licensing, 21 INDUS. RELATIONS 383 (1982); Arlene Holen,
Effects of Professional Licensing Arrangements on Interstate Labor
Mobility and Resource Allocation, 73 J. POL. ECON. 492, 492 (1965); Janna
E. Johnson & Morris M. Kleiner, Is Occupational Licensing a Barrier to
Interstate Migration?, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 24107, 2017).

18.

See WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 8, 25, 27.

19.

See, e.g., Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Beth Avery, Unlicensed &
Untapped: Removing Barriers to State Occupational Licenses for People
EMP.
L.
PROJECT,
1
(2016),
with
Records,
NAT’L
http://nelp.org/content/uploads/Unlicensed-Untapped-RemovingBarriers-State-Occupational-Licenses.pdf (finding over 12,000 licensing
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One important problem with the current licensure system that has
received less attention is that it impedes access to health care. Although
licensing requirements for health care providers are widely viewed as
necessary to protect public safety, several features of the licensure
system obstruct access to health care while doing little to ensure
quality. For instance, licensing restrictions prevent health care
providers such as nurse practitioners from offering services to the full
extent of their competency, obstruct the adoption of telehealth by often
requiring that health care providers be separately licensed in each state
in which their patients are located, and deter foreign-trained providers
from practicing in the United States by requiring them to complete
costly often duplicative training and testing.20
Despite criticism of this system, the United States licensing regime
has proven to be remarkably resistant to change. One reason for this is
interest group politics: many of the benefits of licensure accrue to the
licensed professionals who make up these organizations, while its costs
are dispersed broadly across the population.21 Yet the story is more
complicated than that: licensing is also often viewed as a signal of the
prestige and value of a profession, so many licensed professionals regard
efforts to reform licensing as attacks on their profession’s worth.22 These
dynamics have led some scholars to conclude that the political process
is incapable of reforming licensing , and that litigation is the only viable
option.23
This article shows that while these barriers are formidable, they are
not insuperable. In recent years, the federal government has taken a
number of initial steps aimed at improving access to health care by
reforming licensing restrictions for health care providers. For instance,
the federal government has recently eased licensing restrictions for
health care providers in certain areas where it already possesses
regulatory authority, created incentives for states and professional
restrictions that automatically disqualify individuals with any type of
felony, and over 6,000 restrictions that disqualify people with a
misdemeanor); WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 38, 41.
20.

See infra Part II.

21.

See John Blevins, License to Uber: Using Administrative Law to Fix
Occupational Licensing, 64 UCLA L. REV. 844, 848 (2017)
(“[O]ccupational licensing is difficult to reform because it provides
concentrated benefits to an organized few, while imposing costs diffusely
on the public.”); David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of
Residential Stability, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 119 (2017) (“The politics of
occupational licensing follow a classic Olsonian script.”). See generally,
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 43 (1965); George Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).

22.

SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 210.

23.

See, e.g. Blevins, supra note 21, at 870.

298

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming
Occupational Licensing

bodies to experiment with reforms, intensified its focus on licensing
boards’ anti-competitive conduct, and created additional pressure for
state-level reforms through expanding health insurance and promoting
delivery system reforms under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).24
Together, these steps represent a federalist approach to licensing
reform, in which the federal government incentivizes states to change
their licensing laws, while largely preserving states’ control over their
licensing regimes. Although these measures are limited, they
demonstrate that the federal government is capable of reforming
licensing, and together they pave a path toward improving access to
health care. They also illustrate the range of tools the federal
government has at its disposal to reform the licensing system, short of
simply preempting state law.
Describing an approach in which the federal government intrudes
onto a traditional area of state sovereignty as “federalist” may appear
to be a misnomer.25 Yet the traditional notion of “dual federalism,” in
which the federal government and states have completely separate
spheres of authority and do not coordinate with one another,26 is no
longer as relevant today when “Congress’s lawmaking reach . . . is now
essentially unlimited with respect to the areas into which federal
statutory power can go.”27 Rather, as argued by Professor Abbe Gluck,
federalism today—”in the sense of state power, relevance, autonomy,
and sovereignty—mostly comes and goes at Congress’s pleasure.”28 This
new brand of federalism, which Gluck has labeled “intrastatutory
24.

See infra Part III.

25.

Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview,
123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1890 (2014) (“You might think that a ‘nationalist
school of federalism’ is a contradiction in terms. It isn’t.”).

26.

Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001).

27.

Abbe R. Gluck, Nationalism as the New Federalism (and Federalism as
the New Nationalism): A Complementary Account (and Some Challenges)
to the Nationalist School, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1045, 1049 (2015)
[hereinafter Gluck, New Federalism]. See also Theodore W. Ruger, ‘Our
Federalism’ Moves Indoors 38 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 283, 284-285
(2013) (“[T]his binary toggle is a far-from-realistic depiction of American
federalism as it has operated for at least half a century.”).

28.

Gluck, New Federalism, supra note 27, at 1049. Professor Gluck has
developed this argument in a series of papers. See generally Abbe R.
Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE
L. J. 534, 540 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism]; Abbe
R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1998 (2014)
[hereinafter Gluck, [National] Federalism]; Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism
from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned
Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1749 (2013) [hereinafter
Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes].
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federalism” or “national federalism,”29 stems specifically from
Congress’s decisions to delegate the administration of federal schemes
to the states. This notion of federalism—which this article hereafter will
refer to simply as “federalism”—is expansive, and encompasses a range
of distinct federal-state arrangements.30
In applying this federalist framework to the specific context of
occupational licensing, this paper explores how it can be used to
overcome the institutional and political economy factors that have
served to entrench the problems in the existing regulatory apparatus.
This emphasis differs from that of Gluck, who focuses on how state
administration of federal law can both serve national ends and
effectuate traditional federalist values, as well as on the implications of
these arrangements for legal doctrine.31 It also is distinct from much of
the existing literature on federalism and public choice, which tends to
focus on questions of how—and to what extent—federalism doctrine
should incorporate public choice theory and on how public choice
dynamics support or undermine potential justifications for federal
intervention.32
29.

Gluck, [National] Federalism, supra note 28, at 1998. See also Gerken,
supra note 25, at 1893-94 (“Too often federalism scholars have treated
sovereignty and autonomy as if they were the only forms of state
power . . . They’ve neglected the different but equally important forms of
state power that are at the heart of the nationalist school’s work on
federalism: The power states enjoy as national government’s agents.”).
Edward Rubin refers to this relationship between the federal government
and the states as “decentralization,” and distinguishes it federalism. See
Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative
Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2085-86 (2005) (contrasting
decentralization, a “managerial strategy” in which “the central
government . . . decides how decisionmaking authority will be divided
between itself and the geographic subdivisions and when that allocation
will be changed,” with federalism, which “grants subsidiary units a final
say in certain areas.”); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:
Some Notes on A National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-915
(1994) (distinguishing between decentralization and federalism, and
arguing that “many standard arguments advanced for federalism are
clearly nothing more than policy arguments for decentralization.”).

30.

Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 28, at 540 (“[T]he typically
undifferentiated category of ‘cooperative federalism’ has far more internal
nuances than we currently acknowledge.”).

31.

See, e.g., Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1756;
see also Gerken, supra note 25, at 1893 (arguing that “federalism can be
a tool for improving national politics, strengthening a national polity,
bettering national policymaking, entrenching national norms,
consolidating national policies, and increasing national power.”).

32.

See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE & PUBLIC LAW 207, 207 (Daniel A. Farber
& Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (“The public choice literature on
federalism and its near-relation, localism, is voluminous in size but narrow
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The article shows that this federalist approach is more feasible than
two alternatives: either appealing to state governments to reform their
own licensing regimes, or alternatively, calling on the federal
government to simply preempt state licensing laws. Proposals in the
first category (dual federalist proposals) appeal to state governments to
restructure their licensing regimes, but often do not acknowledge states’
lack of incentives to enact sufficient reforms.33 By contrast, proposals
in the second category advocate that the federal government should
step in and preempt large swaths of state law, but they do not take
into account the institutional and political challenges involved in such
an approach.34
This article evaluates both of these approaches and concludes that
they are implausible and that federalism represents the best path
toward reforming licensing. Some amount of federal intervention is
necessary because states lack the incentives to experiment with largescale licensing reforms on their own; each state’s licensing laws impose
externalities on the citizens of other states and on the national labor
market; and states face collective action problems.35 Although this
might seem to support federal preemption, a federalist approach is in
fact more viable: it is more flexible and capable of overcoming interest
group opposition and it obviates Congress’s historical unwillingness to
repeal large areas of state law. Moreover, a federalist approach has
important functional advantages over full-scale federal preemption,
including encouraging experimentation in the face of policy uncertainty
and making use of states’ administrative experience.36
in focus . . . Most of this literature revolves around the idea of mobility
between competing subnational jurisdictions.”). See, e.g., Robert D.
Cooter and Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 161-62 (2010); Richard L.
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the ‘Race to the
Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1210, 1212 (1992).
33.

Schleicher, supra note 21, at 149 (“A too-easy answer is that states
and localities should simply fix the problem by changing their policies.
These governments created the problem, the argument goes, so they
should fix it. But it is not so easy.”) (citing Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743
(2013)).

34.

Philip Weiser terms this latter type of proposal as “preemptive
federalism.” Weiser, supra note 26, at 665-66 (“Preemptive federalism,
like dual federalism, views the federal government and the states as two
separate spheres, but instead of leaving room for state regulation, it
preempts all state authority and supplants it with a unitary federal
regime.”).

35.

See infra Part IV.B.

36.

See infra Part IV.C.
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A federalist approach is not only theoretically viable, but also the
federal government has already begun to adopt such an approach—
albeit in an ad hoc limited fashion. Even these limited steps have the
potential to improve access to health care, if recognized and scaled up.
Yet some of these federal actions, and the ways in which they have
begun to influence licensing requirements for health care providers, have
hitherto largely gone unrecognized.37
Although this article focuses specifically on licensing requirements
for health care providers, the analyses and conclusions in this paper are
relevant for other areas of licensing, as well as for other kinds of state
regulation that also deliver economic rents and have nationwide
economic externalities. There is a growing recognition among
researchers and policymakers that state and local regulatory policies on
subjects such as occupational licensing, land-use regulation, and noncompete agreements have important economic implications for the
United States as a whole.38 For instance, according to one study,
stringent land use regulations in “high productivity” cities like New
York and San Francisco lowered overall US growth by thirty-six
percent from 1964 to 2009.39 Other research suggests that land-use
regulations have played an important role in the rise of economic
inequality.40 This article provides a general framework for how
policymakers can address these issues, and explores some of the specific
37.

See, e.g., Ruger, supra note 27, at 285 (“Some crucial areas of health care
that have for decades been unquestionably fair game for federal regulation
under the post-New Deal commerce clause, like the practice of medicine
by individual physicians, have nonetheless gone entirely unregulated by
Congress.”).

38.

See, e.g., OFFICE ECON. POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, NON-COMPETE
CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2016);
Furman, supra note 15, at 1-2; Lawrence H. Summers, The Inequality
Puzzle, 33 DEMOCRACY (2014), available at https://democracyjournal.org/
magazine/33/the-inequality-puzzle/. (“Probably the two most important
steps that public policy can take with respect to wealth inequality are the
strengthening of financial regulation to more fully eliminate implicit and
explicit subsidies to financial activity, and an easing of land-use
restrictions that cause the real estate of the rich in major metropolitan
areas to keep rising in value.”); Ilya Somin, Time to Get Moving on
Making It Easier for Americans to Move, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY BLOG (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/23/time-to-get-moving-on-makingit-easier-for-americans-to-move (describing an “increasing crossideological consensus among experts in the field” that land-use regulations
and occupational licensing represent important problems).

39.

Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial
Misallocation 11 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 1 (2019).

40.

See Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional Income
Convergence in the U.S. Declined?, 102 J. URB. ECON. 76 (2017).
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tools that the federal government has at its disposal to affect state
regulation, short of outright preemption.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief overview
of the occupational licensing system in the United States, including
states’ legal authority to license workers, and their history of doing so.
Part II explores some of the problems with this system, in particular
focusing on how licensing requirements for health care providers serve
to impede access to health care. Part III examines several recent steps
that the federal government has taken to reform licensing restrictions
for health care providers which illustrate a federalist approach to
licensing reform. Part IV compares the federalist approach to
alternative proposals that either rely primarily on state-level reforms
or call for federal preemption, and concludes that these alternative
approaches are inadequate. It evaluates the justifications for federal
intervention and outlines several practical and normative advantages of
this federalist approach over full-scale federal preemption.

I.

Licensing and Its Origins
A.

Structure and Function

Occupational licensing statutes typically have several components:
they offer a definition of the relevant profession (though often that
statutory definition can be quite broad and vague);41 they provide that
it is unlawful to practice, attempt to practice, or hold oneself out as
practicing in that profession without a license;42 they enumerate certain
educational, training, and testing requirements to obtain a license; they
specify the range of services professionals are allowed to offer—their socalled “scope of practice”—along with any conditions that are attached
to these services; they enumerate disciplinary penalties for those who
violate these standards and procedures for enforcing such violations;
and they usually establish a state licensing board to interpret and
enforce the act.43
41.

See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5-1-1.1 (West 2019) (quoted in Sandra
Johnson, Structure of Governmental Oversight of Quality in Healthcare,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK U.S. HEALTH L. 502-503 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison
K. Hoffman, & William M. Sage eds., 1st ed., Oxford University Press
2017)) (defining the “practice of medicine” as including “the diagnosis,
treatment, correction, or prevention of any disease, ailment, defect, injury,
infirmity, deformity, pain, or other condition of human beings; the
suggestion, recommendation, or prescription or administration of any
form of treatment, without limitation; [and] the performing of any kind
of surgical operation upon a human being, including tattooing”).

42.

See, e.g, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (West 2019); 63 PA. STAT. AND
CONS STAT. ANN. § 422 (West 2018).

43.

See Johnson, supra note 41, at 490; BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAW 6 (3d ed. 2015); TIMOTHY S. JOST, Introduction—Regulation of the
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States have delegated authority to set and enforce licensing
restriction to licensing boards, which in turn are largely populated by
members of licensed professions.44 These boards are charged with
“serv[ing] as gatekeepers to determine the qualifications and
competence of applicants . . . see[ing] that standards are adhered to by
practitioners, and when necessary, adjudicat[ing] disputes between the
public and members of the regulated occupation.”45 The fact that many
of these boards are primarily composed of members of the licensed
professions presents an obvious conflict of interest, as these
professionals have an incentive to insulate themselves from competition
by erecting excessive barriers to entry and to be lenient when enforcing
violations against their peers.46
B.

History

Physicians were among the earliest professions to be licensed, with
a number of states establishing medical licensing laws prior to the
Revolutionary War.47 The early licensing laws were “primarily
honorific”—they typically did not regulate entry into the profession or
establish minimum educational standards, and they were rarely
enforced.48 In the early 1800s, states began to pass measures designed
Healthcare Professions,
PROFESSIONS 2-5 (1997).

in

REGULATION

OF

THE

HEALTHCARE

44.

Allensworth, supra note 3, at 1570 (finding that “of the 1,790 total
[licensing] boards [in the United States], 1,515, or 85 percent, are required
by statute to be comprised of a majority of currently licensed
professionals, active in the very profession the board regulates.”); Aaron
Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1103
(2014) (surveying all occupational licensing boards—including, but not
limited to—health care professions in Florida and Tennessee, and finding
that “license-holders active in the profession have a majority on 90% of
boards in Florida and 93% of boards in Tennessee.”). C.f. David Swankin,
The Role of the Public Member on Licensing Boards, FEDERATION FORUM
(Fall
2010),
https://www.fsbpt.org/download/Forum_Fall2010_
PublicMember.pdf (noting that in California, all non-health licensing
boards have a majority of public members).

45.

SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 14-15.

46.

CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, FTC, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 1 (1990); FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at
4; SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 13; Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at
1111; Alan Levine et al., State Medical Boards Fail to Discipline Doctors
with Hospital Actions Against Them, PUB. CITIZEN at 14 (2011),
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/1937.pdf.

47.

Lewis A. Grossman, The Origins of American Health Libertarianism, 13
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 76, 88-89 (2013).

48.

PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
(1982).
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to render their medical licensing laws more effective, but shortly
thereafter, many states weakened or repealed their laws in response to
a backlash from advocates promoting “medical freedom.”49
After the Civil War, there was a “second wave” of physician
licensing, and states one after another began to pass exclusionary
licensing laws that punished unlicensed practice by fine or
imprisonment.50 These laws expanded beyond traditionally-licensed
professions such as physicians and dentists to professions such as
accountants and nurses.51 What drove this expansion is a matter of
some scholarly debate:52 some have argued that it primarily represented
an attempt to limit competition and increase market power;53 others
have found evidence that it was driven by a desire to exclude lowquality practitioners in the face of advances in science and technology
that made it more difficult for consumers to assess practitioners’ quality
on their own.54
At first, even these new exclusionary licensing laws still did not
substantially restrict entry into most professions, either because the
requirements they imposed were weak or the licensing boards they
established were ineffective.55 Charles Eliot, who was President of

49.

Grossman, supra note 47, at 102-04.

50.

Id. at 129.

51.

Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise
of Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing
Regulation. 65 J. ECON. HIST., 723, 730-731 (2005).

52.

Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care:
Regulation, Management, or the Market? 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 828 (1995)
(“The nineteenth century origins of physician licensure have been
thoroughly studied, and a variety of theories have emerged as to why
licensure was in fact adopted.”).

53.

See, e.g., STARR, supra note 48, at 103; Samuel L. Baker, Physician
Licensure Laws in the United States, 1865-1915, 39 J. HIST. MED. ALLIED
SCI. 173, 192 (1984).

54.

See RICHARD HARRISON SHRYOCK, MEDICAL LICENSING IN AMERICA, 16501965, 43-44 (1967); Law & Kim, supra note 51, at 729 (finding that
licensing restrictions were adopted during the Progressive ERA in
response to developments which made it harder for consumers to evaluate
provider quality). These explanations are not necessarily mutally
exclusive. See CHRISTY FORD CHAPIN, ENSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH—
THE PUBLIC CREATION OF THE CORPORATE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 14-15
(2015) (describing how the American Medical Association harnessed
scientific discoveries at the end of the 19th century to make licensing
standards more stringent, improving physicians’ quality and increasing
their market power).

55.

Law & Kim, supra note 51, at 726.

305

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming
Occupational Licensing

Harvard from the late nineteenth to early twentieth century,56
reportedly “remarked that in those days anybody could ‘walk into a
medical school from the street’ . . . [adding] that many who did walk in
‘could barely read and write.’”57 In the decades that followed, however,
state legislatures began to ratchet up the requirements to obtain a
license, for example, by requiring medical schools to lengthen their
curricula and requiring doctors to pass an exam.58
As the twentieth century progressed, many other professions sought
and were granted licensure by state governments.59 By the middle of
the 20th century, states had enacted more than 1,200 statutes for at
least 75 different occupations.60 Over 300 occupations were licensed by
1973.61 A 1994 study found that over 800 occupations were licensed by
at least one of the 50 states.62 More recent evidence has confirmed that
the expansion of licensing has continued to the present day. Morris
Kleiner and Alan Krueger found that the proportion of the workforce
licensed at the state level grew from less than 5 percent in the early
1950s to 29% by 2008.63 More recent evidence based on a larger survey
sample suggests that a slightly lower proportion of the workforce –
closer to one-quarter – holds an occupational license.64
C.

Legal Authority and Policy Justifications

States’ constitutional authority to license professions stems from
the police power, which under the Tenth Amendment reserves to the
states the authority to pass regulations that further the public’s health,

56.

Charles William Eliot, HARV. U., https://www.harvard.edu/aboutharvard/harvard-glance/history-presidency/charles-william-eliot
(last
visited Oct. 10, 2017).

57.

Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
6, 9 (1976); see also STARR, supra note 48, at 102.

58.

See STARR, supra note 48, at 104-05; Baker, supra note 53, at 189-90.

59.

SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 16 (“Between 1910 and 1919
approximately 130 statutes regulating 14 [health-related] professions were
passed.”)

60.

Law & Kim, supra note 51, at 725-726.

61.

COX & FOSTER, supra note 46, at 3 (citing D. L. Martin, Will the Sun Set
on Occupational Licensing?, 53 ST. GOV. 63 (1980)).

62.

Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, supra note 2, at 190 (citing COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS LICENSED BY THE
STATES, PUERTO RICO AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS (1994)).

63.

Kleiner & Krueger, Labor Market, supra note 11, at S176; Morris M.
Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational
Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 676, 677-678 (2010) [hereinafter Kleiner
& Krueger, Prevalence and Effects].

64.

See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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safety, and general welfare.65 The primary justification for licensure—
and the one that has been expressly recognized by the courts—is to
protect the public from inept or dangerous practitioners.66 Courts have
historically been very deferential in reviewing states’ authority to
invoke the police power, typically upholding legislation under this
power if its contribution to health and public safety is “at least fairly
debatable.”67 While there have been some recent successful
constitutional claims brought against licensing regimes,68 courts have
generally been unwilling to strike down licensing schemes as
unconstitutional.69
65.

FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 5.

66.

See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889). (“The power of the
State to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes it to
prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to
secure them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, as well
as of deception and fraud.”). See also Thomas v. Collins, 65 S.Ct. 315,
329 (1945), (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The modern state owes and
attempts to perform a duty to protect the public from those who seek for
one purpose or another to obtain its money. When one does so through
the practice of a calling, the state may have an interest in shielding the
public against the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible,
or against unauthorized representation of agency. A usual method of
performing this function is through a licensing system.”); Timothy S. Jost,
Oversight of the Competence of Healthcare Professionals, in REGULATION
OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 1, 20 (1992). But see Nick Robinson,
The Multiple Justifications of Occupational Licensing, 93 WASH. L. REV.
1903 (2018) (proposing other justifications for occupational licensing
besides consumer protection).

67.

Johnson, supra note 41, at 494; FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 15;
MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 1207-08 (8th ed.
2013) (“Courts uniformly have upheld state licensing regulations so long
as they are rationally related to serving some legitimate state interest.”)
(citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)).
See also Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd.
of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2000); Sherman v. Crynsc, 786
N.E.2d 139 (Ill. 2003).

68.

See, e.g., Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69,
73 (Tex. 2015) (holding that a Texas law requiring eyebrow-threaders to
obtain a cosmetology license violated the Due Process Clause); St. Joseph
Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 226-227 (5th Cir. 2013) (invalidating a
Louisiana law prohibiting unlicensed casket sales).

69.

See Blevins, supra note 21, at 876 (“[C]onstitutional law provides a weak
doctrinal toolkit to challenge occupational licensing laws. Courts can only
invalidate them by ignoring decades of firmly established, and strongly
deferential, precedent.”); Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1134
(“Constitutional suits alone cannot curtail the anticompetitive effects of
professional licensing . . . [because] they are almost impossible to win.”);
Joseph Sanderson, Note, Don’t Bury the Competition: Occupational
Licensing and a Toolbox for Reform, 31 YALE. J. REG. 455, 456 (2014)
(“With a handful of exceptions . . . courts have upheld even the most
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The justification for licensure has the most force in fields such as
health care, where the public lacks the information or expertise to
properly evaluate the competence of practitioners, and where
incompetent practitioners can inflict severe harm.70 If consumers cannot
distinguish between high- and low-quality practitioners, then there is
less incentive for practitioners to undertake the costly investments
necessary to improve the quality of their services, which in turn reduces
the average quality of the service being provided.71 In addition, in some
contexts, low-quality practitioners can inflict harm not only on the
persons who paid for their services, but also on third parties as well.72
Nevertheless, many economists and legal scholars have expressed
skepticism that licensing improves quality, arguing that its primary
purpose is to limit competition and drive up the wages of licensed
professionals.73 They point to several factors, including: the dearth of
egregiously protectionist licensing schemes as constitutional.”). But see
David E. Bernstein, The Due Process Right to Pursue a Lawful
Occupation: A Brighter Future Ahead?, 126 YALE L.J. 287, 287 (2016)
(“Recent precedent . . . suggests that courts are becoming more protective
of what has traditionally been considered a subset of liberty of contract:
the right to pursue an occupation.”); Clark Neily, Beating Rubber-Stamps
into Gavels: A Fresh Look at Occupational Freedom, 126 YALE L.J. 304,
305 (2016) (arguing that “several trends in constitutional scholarship and
doctrine suggest that a transformation of that jurisprudence may be closer
at hand than many would suppose.”).
70.

See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AMER. ECON. REV. 941, 967 (1963) (“The choice among these
alternatives [licensure, certification, and laissez-faire approaches to
regulating occupations] in any given case depends on the degree of
difficulty consumers have in making the choice unaided, and on the
consequences of errors of judgment. It is the general social consensus,
clearly, that the laissez-faire solution for medicine is intolerable. The
certification proposal never seems to have been discussed seriously.”).

71.

See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).

72.

Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, supra note 2, at 192 (“[I]t is argued that
in some cases, a poor quality service is not just a matter between employer
and employee. A doctor who makes a bad diagnosis may cause a
widespread epidemic. A boilermaker who installs a furnace incorrectly
may cause a building to catch fire, injuring or killing many persons. In
this sense, requiring a practitioner to be trained at a minimum level
recognizes a form of regulation which may produce positive social
payoffs.”).

73.

Gellhorn, supra note 57, at 11 (“That restricting access is the real purpose,
and not merely a side effect, of many if not most successful campaigns to
institute licensing schemes can scarcely be doubted.”); Law & Kim, supra
note 51, at 724 (“The dominant view today is that the regulatory licensing
process has been captured by industry to erect entry restrictions for its
own benefit.”); Keith B. Leffler, Physician Licensure: Competition and
Monopoly in American Medicine, 21 J.L. & ECON. 165, 165 (1978) (“It is

308

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming
Occupational Licensing

empirical evidence showing that occupational licensing improves
quality;74 the fact that licensing requirements often do not bear any
relation to competency or to the specific demands of a profession;75 the
fact that licensing requirements often vary dramatically from state to
state;76 the practice of “grandfathering” current practitioners when a
profession becomes licensed (allowing them to practice even when they
do not meet all the standards imposed by the new licensing law);77 and
the evidence that a profession’s political power is an important
determinant of whether or not it is licensed, as well as the
restrictiveness of licensing laws.78
Although many licensing requirements likely do little to improve
quality, some of the critiques of licensing may be overstating the
evidence. While it is true that most empirical scholarship does not find
that licensing requirements improve quality, much of this scholarship
has focused on relatively small discrepancies among states’ licensing
policies for professions that have long been subject to licensure.79 By
widely believed among economists that barriers to entry into medical
practice have been erected for the economic advantage of those practicing
medicine.”).
74.

See, e.g., WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 3 (reviewing several empirical
studies on the impact of licensing on quality); Edlin & Haw, supra note
44, at 1116 (“The economic research on quality of service as a function of
licensing paints a murky picture.”).

75.

See, e.g., DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, LICENSE TO
WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
7, 8 (2nd ed. 2017) (finding that licensing laws on average require
cosmetologists to have over 10 times as many days of training as
emergency medical technicians.); Gellhorn, supra note 57, at 13-19 (citing
numerous examples, such as citizenship and residency requirements); Paul
J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 219-220 (2016) (“There also appears to be
no rational relationship between the stringency of the licensing
requirements and the demands placed on practitioners.”).

76.

See CARPENTER II ET AL., supra note 75, at 7 (finding that four states
require four years of experience to obtain a residential landscape
contractor license, while forty other states require no experience).

77.

SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 13; Kleiner et al., A Proposal, supra
note 14, at 8.

78.

See, e.g., Benjamin J. McMichael, The Demand for Healthcare
Regulation: The Effect of Political Spending on Occupational Licensing
Laws, 84 S. ECON. J. 297, (2017); Chris Paul, Physician Licensure
Legislation and the Quality of Medical Care, 12(4) ATLANTIC ECON. J. 18,
20-21 (1984); William D. White, Mandatory Licensing of Registered
Nurses: Introduction and Impact, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND
REGULATION 47, 57-61 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980).

79.

WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 60 (“[M]ost of the empirical evidence on
licensing comes from looking at very specific examples. While the
aforementioned studies indicate that occupational licensing does not

309

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming
Occupational Licensing

contrast, the few empirical studies that focus on the initial adoption of
licensing laws for health care professions find that they have in fact had
important impacts on consumers’ health and safety.80
Moreover, even some of the fiercest critics of licensing concede that
the justification for licensing is stronger in health care.81 Thus, in the
context of health care, most reform proposals have tended to focus on
reforming specific aspects of the existing licensing system, rather than
getting rid of it altogether.82

II. The Impact of Licensing on Access to Health Care
Many of the costs of the current licensing system have been welldocumented. By limiting entry into the licensed profession, licensing
reduces employment in those professions, thereby increasing the wages
of licensed professionals and raising the prices that consumers pay for
services.83 Restrictive rules of practice (known as “scope of practice”
restrictions) further depress wages for licensed professions subject to
these restrictions (such as nurses or dental hygienists) and elevate them

guarantee quality improvements, they likewise do not indicate that all
licensing frameworks fail to increase service quality”).
80.

See, e.g., Mark Anderson et al., The Effect of Occupational Licensing on
Consumer Welfare: Early Midwifery Laws and Maternal Mortality 27
(NBER Working Paper No. 22456, 2016); Law & Kim, supra note 51.

81.

See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 138 (1962) (“I
agree that the case for licensure is stronger for medicine than for most
other fields.”); James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence
with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public
Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1566 (2010) (“No one
seriously disputes the need for some form of professional regulation in the
presence of large information asymmetries and serious spillover effects. In
most cases it is difficult, if not impossible, for a consumer to judge the
quality of her physician or attorney, and these practitioners are unlikely
to internalize the full costs of their mistakes. Some level of state
credentialing and regulation makes sense.”); Shirley V. Svorny, Beyond
Medical Licensure, 38 REG. 26, 26 (2015) (“But when it comes to medical
professionals, many of the staunchest critics of licensing back off.”).

82.

See infra Part IV. But see FRIEDMAN, supra note 81, at 135-160; Charles
H. Baron, Licensure of Health Care Professionals: The Consumer’s Case
for Abolition, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 336-341 (1983); Shirley Svorny,
Medical Licensing: An Obstacle to Affordable, Quality Care, 621 POL’Y
ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2008).

83.

See, e.g., Maya N. Federman, David E. Harrington, & Kathy J. Krynski,
The Impact of State Licensing Regulations on Low-Skilled Immigrants:
The Case of Vietnamese Manicurists, 96(2) AM. ECON. REV. 237 (2006);
Kleiner & Krueger, Labor Market, supra note 11; Kleiner & Krueger,
Prevalence and Effects, supra note 63.

310

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming
Occupational Licensing

for professions not subject to them (such as doctors or dentists).84
Differences among states’ licensing regimes, combined with a lack of
reciprocity, make it more difficult for practitioners to relocate or
practice in multiple states.85
This article focuses on one problem that has not received as much
attention: how certain features of current licensure system for health
care providers impede access to health care without improving quality.
Namely, excessive scope of practice restrictions prevent health care
providers such as nurses or dental hygienists from offering services they
are qualified to provide;86 differences in state licensing requirements,
which—combined with the requirement that providers be licensed in
each state in which they practice—make it more difficult for health care
providers to relocate or use telehealth to deliver services in multiple
states;87 and the refusal to recognize the training completed overseas by
foreign health care workers who relocate to the United States.88
These features of the licensing system limit access to health care by
making it less affordable, contributing to lengthy wait times, and
skewing the distribution of health care resources.89 Although the most

84.

Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1112; Morris M. Kleiner et al., Relaxing
Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a
Medical Service, 59(2) J.L. & ECON. 261, 261-64 (2016) [hereinafter
Kleiner et al., Relaxing Requirements].

85.

See e.g., Johnson & Kleiner, supra note 17, at 1-2, 19.

86.

See, e.g., LEONARD J. FINOCCHIO ET AL., REFORMING HEALTH CARE
WORKFORCE REGULATION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 9-13 (1995); Yong-Fang Kuo et al., States with the Least
Restrictive Regulations Experienced the Largest Increase in Patients
Seen by Nurse Practitioners, 32(7) HEALTH AFF. 1236, 1241-42 (2013).

87.

See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TELEHEALTH:
POLICY TRENDS AND CONSIDERATIONS 4 (2015); Amy E. Zilis, The Doctor
Will Skype You Now: How Changing Physician Licensure
Requirements Would Clear the Way for Telemedicine to Achieve the
Goals of the Affordable Care Act, 2012 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 193, 201203 (2012).

88.

See, e.g., Dean Baker, Globalization Hurt Factory Workers. Why Not
Doctors?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/
opinion/op-ed/la-oe-baker-doctor-protectionism-20161127-story.html;
Catherine Rampell, Path to United States Practice is Long Slog to Foreign
Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/
2013/08/12/business/economy/long-slog-for-foreign-doctors-to-practicein-us.html.

89.

See, e.g., FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 2-3 (“Despite its laudable
goals, however, restrictive licensing also produces some negative
outcomes. Health care professionals and their patients are constrained in
their choices concerning treatment, for example, and licensure raises the
costs of health care.”); Baron, supra note 82, at 339 (“Because of its
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prominent barrier to accessing health care in the United States has long
been the lack of affordable health insurance,90 surveys find that
affordability and wait times are substantial impediments to accessing
care in the United States, even for those who have health insurance.91
A 2016 study of eleven developed countries by the Commonwealth
Fund found that U.S. respondents were the most likely to report costrelated problems in accessing care, and that at least one in five
Americans waited six days or more to see a doctor or nurse the last
time they needed care (with low-income Americans especially likely to
have to wait).92 According to one estimate, Americans spend 2.4 billion
hours each year making doctors’ visits—only 17% of which is actually
spent seeing a doctor.93 These challenges are especially acute in some
geographic areas that have shortages of health care providers, or where
patients must travel long distances to see a provider.94
The sections below describe how certain licensure laws hinder access
to health care through excessive scope of practice restrictions,
restrictions on telehealth, and limitations on immigrant health care
providers.

anticompetitive tendencies, licensure has produced higher health care
costs than those which would prevail in a competitive market.”).
90.

Having health insurance is of course an important component of being
able to access care. See generally Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Health
Insurance Coverage and Health—What the Recent Evidence Tells Us, 377
NEW ENG. J. MED. 586, 588 (2017) (reviewing several recent empirical
studies on the effects of health insurance on access to health care and
health outcomes).

91.

See Timothy Jost, Affordability: The Most Urgent Health Reform Issue
for Ordinary Americans, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/02/29/affordability-the-most-urgenthealth-reform-issue-for-ordinary-americans/; Sara Heath, Solutions for
Reducing Healthcare Appointment Wait Times for Patients, XTELLIGENT
HEALTHCARE MEDIA (Mar. 12, 2018), https://patientengagementhit.com
/news/solutions-for-reducing-healthcare-appointment-wait-times-forpatients.

92.

Robin Osborn et al., In New Survey of Eleven Countries, US Adults Still
Struggle with Access to and Affordability of Health Care, 35 HEALTH AFF.
2327, 2330 (2016).

93.

Kristin N. Ray et al., Opportunity Costs of Ambulatory Medical Care in
the United States, 21 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 567 (2015).

94.

Julia Foutz et al., The Role of Medicaid in Rural America, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/the-role-of-medicaid-in-rural-america/; Elizabeth J. Brown et al.,
Racial Disparities in Geographic Access to Primary Care in Philadelphia,
35 HEALTH AFF. 1374, 1379 (2016).
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A.

Scope of Practice

Licensure laws limit access to health care by restricting what types
of services non-physician providers are allowed to provide and
subjecting them to excessively stringent physician supervision
requirements.95 Health care providers’ scopes of practice vary widely,
depending on the profession they pursue. On one end of the spectrum,
physicians are the only profession whose legal scope-of-practice is “allencompassing.”96 State physician practice acts authorize physicians to
perform any function encompassed by “the practice of medicine,”
ranging from drawing blood to performing open-heart surgery.97
Although there are other non-regulatory mechanisms that, in practice,
serve to prevent physicians from providing services that they are
unqualified to provide,98 physician organizations have historically
resisted imposing any legal limitations on their legal scope-of-practice.99
By contrast, other health care providers, such as nurses and
physician assistants, have much narrower scopes of practice and are
often subject to restrictions on their ability to practice or have
supervision requirements. These restrictions vary dramatically from
state to state, and occasionally may even vary within a given state.100
For example, although 22 states and the District of Columbia allow
Nurse Practitioners (NPs) to provide certain types of health care
services independently (including diagnosing patients, initiating and
managing certain conditions, prescribing medications, and referring), 16
states require that NPs be supervised by a physician to prescribe

95.

E. KATHLEEN ADAMS & SARA MARKOWITZ, IMPROVING EFFICIENCY IN THE
HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM: REMOVING ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS FOR
ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS,
THE HAMILTON PROJECT at 6 (2018).

96.

Barbara Safriet, Impediments to Progress in Health Care Workforce
Policy: License and Practice Laws, 31 INQUIRY 310, 311 (1994)
[hereinafter Safriet, Impediments].

97.

Id.

98.

Barbara J. Safriet, Federal Options for Maximizing the Value of Advanced
Practice Nurses in Providing Quality, Cost-Effective Health Care, in THE
FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH 443, 453
(The Nat’l Acads. Press, 2011) (these include “norms deriving from
common sense and decency, professional ethics and judgment,
institutional credentialing and voluntary accreditation standards, and
insurance concerns.”) [hereinafter Safriet, Federal Options].

99.

See William M. Sage & Linda H. Aiken, Regulating Interdisciplinary
Practice, in REGULATING HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 74, 74 (Timothy Jost
ed., 1992).

100. Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-Care
Providers’ Scope of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J. REG.
301, 313-315 (2002) [hereinafter Safriet, Closing the Gap].
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medications, and 12 states require NPs to have physician oversight to
prescribe, diagnose, and treat patients (as of March 2019).101 Similarly,
while all states require Physician Assistants to be supervised by a
physician, some states specifically require them to work in the same
facility as their supervising physicians, while others require only that
the physician be reachable by phone.102
A burgeoning body of empirical research suggests that excessive
scope of practice restrictions limit access to care without improving
quality. For instance, one study found that more stringent scope-ofpractice restrictions for NPs increase the price of well-child visits
without any evidence of improved health outcomes.103 Another study
found that more stringent scope-of-practice restrictions for dental
hygienists reduces access to dental care.104 Other research found that
the stringency of scope-of-practice restrictions for Certified Nurse
Midwives does not affect maternal or infant health outcomes.105 One
recent study found that broadening prescriptive authority for NPs is
associated with improvements in patients’ mental health and decreases
in mortality related to mental health.106
A wide range of organizations and institutions, including the
Institute of Medicine, the Pew Health Professions Commission, the
Rand Corporation, and the FTC, have focused in particular on the
potential of expanding scope of practice restrictions for Advanced
Practice Nurses (APNs) (a category of registered nurses who have
graduate degrees which includes Nurse Practitioners, Registered Nurse
Anesthetists, Nurse-Midwives, and Clinical Nurse Specialists)107 to
improve access to both primary care and acute care without sacrificing

101. State Practice Environment, AM. ASS’N NURSE PRAC. (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.aanp.org/legislation-regulation/state-legislation/statepractice-environment.
102. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 33.
103. Kleiner et al., Relaxing Requirements, supra note 84, at 263.
104. Tanya Wanchek, Dental Hygiene Regulation and Access to Oral
Healthcare: Assessing the Variation Across the US States, 48 BRITISH J.
OF INDUS. REL. 706, 723 (2010).
105. Sara Markowitz et al., Competitive Effects of Scope of Practice
Restrictions: Public Health or Public Harm?, 55 J. HEALTH ECON. 201,
216 (2017).
106. Diane Alexander & Molly Schnell, Just What the Nurse Practitioner
Ordered: Independent Prescriptive Authority and Population Mental
Health (Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. WP-2017-8, 2016).
107. Advanced
Practice
Nurses,
NURSING
LICENSE
MAP,
https://nursinglicensemap.com/advanced-practice-nursing/ (last visited
Mar. 18, 2019).

314

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming
Occupational Licensing

quality.108 Drawing on empirical research finding that the quality of care
provided by APNs is similar to that provided by physicians for certain
services,109 these organizations have recommended that states allow
APNs “to practice to the full extent of their education and training.”110
B.

Telehealth

Another way in which state licensing impedes access to health care
without improving quality is by making it more difficult for health care
providers to practice in multiple states, either remotely via telehealth
or in-person.111 Through the use of video and data transmission,
telehealth can allow patients to remotely access consultations,
diagnoses, and treatments when no providers are readily available
nearby, or to help providers communicate with each other and manage
care more efficiently.112 Proponents of telehealth have hailed its

108. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, POLICY PERSPECTIVES: COMPETITION
AND THE REGULATION OF ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSES (2014); see
FINOCCHIO ET AL., supra note 86, at 11.
109. See, e.g., R.P. Newhouse et al., Advanced Practice Nurse Outcomes 19902008: A Systematic Review, 29 NURSING ECON. 230, 235 (2011); Julie
Stanik-Hutt et al., The Quality and Effectiveness of Care Provided by
Nurse Practitioners, 9 J. NURSE PRACTITIONERS 492, 496 (2013); Mary O.
Mundinger et al., Primary Care Outcomes in Patients Treated by Nurse
Practitioners or Physicians: A Randomized Trial, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
59 (2000).
110. INST. MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING
HEALTH 1 (2011) [hereinafter INST. MED.]. See also FINOCCHIO ET AL.,
supra note 86, at 9; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 108, at 38.
111. This article follows the American Telemedicine Association in using the
terms telehealth and telemedicine interchangeably. Telemedicine FAQs,
AM.
TELEMEDICINE
ASS’N
(Sept.
20,
2017),
http://www.americantelemed.org/main/about/about-telemedicine/
telemedicine-faqs. Others use both terms to describe “the use of
technology to exchange information to improve a patient’s health status,”
but understand telemedicine to refer to only direct clinical services and
the term telehealth to refer to a broader scope of health-related services
(e,g., patient education, remote monitoring, etc.). Tracy A. Lustig, The
Role of Telehealth in an Evolving Health Care Environment: Workshop
Summary, INST. MED. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 3 (2012) (citing Dr. Thomas S.
Nesbitt).
112. According to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the
term telehealth encompasses four basic functions: (1) synchronous
communication—live video interactions, such as those between a patient
and a provider; (2) store-and-forward technology—the transmission of
medical data, videos, and digital images to a provider; (3) remote patient
monitoring—the transmission of “personal health and medical data
collection from an individual in one location, which is transmitted to a
provider in a different location”; and (4) mobile health—”[s]martphone
apps designed to foster health and well-being.” U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
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potential to change the delivery of health care as “transcendent.”113 It
holds particular promise for improving access to care, especially for
people who live far away from major health care centers and for people
afflicted with chronic conditions who require frequent consultation with
health care providers.114
Early evaluations of telehealth programs have been encouraging,
though they also suggest that telehealth should not be viewed as a
panacea. One study of an electronic exchange system linking primary
care providers and specialists at San Francisco General Hospital found
that around 20% of specialist consultations were resolved without
requiring an in-person visit, and that wait times were dramatically
reduced for those patients who did require an in-person visit.115 A study
of Teladoc, a direct-to-consumer telehealth company, found that its
service made accessing care more convenient, though it also had the
potential to further stress overtaxed health care systems by leading to
greater utilization of health care services.116
Perhaps the most important barrier to more widespread adoption
of telehealth is state-specific occupational licensing regimes.117 As many
HUM. SERVICES, E-HEALTH AND TELEMEDICINE 5 (2016) [hereinafter U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES].
113. Carl F. Ameringer, State-Based Licensure of Telemedicine: The Need for
Uniformity but Not a National Scheme, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y
55, 56 (2012).
114. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, supra note 112, at 4; Bill Frist,
Telemedicine: A Solution to Address the Problems of Cost, Access, and
Quality, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Jul. 23, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2015/07/23/telemedicine-a-solution-to-address-the-problems-ofcost-access-and-quality/. But see Lori Uscher-Pines & Ateev Mehrotra,
Telehealth Alone Will Not Increase Health Care Access for the
Underserved, RAND BLOG (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.rand.org/
blog/2016/12/telehealth-alone-will-not-increase-health-care-access.html
(concluding that expanding telehealth will generate new demand for
health care services that will require in-person visits, and proposing
several potential solutions.).
115. Alice Hm Chen et al., eReferral—A New Model for Integrated Care, 368
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2450, 2451 (2013).
116. Uscher-Pines & Mehrotra, supra note 114; J. Scott Ashwood et al., DirectTo-Consumer Telehealth May Increase Access to Care but Does Not
Decrease Spending, 36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 485 (2017).
117. See, e.g., Julia Adler-Milstein et al., Telehealth Among US Hospitals:
Several Factors, Including State Reimbursement and Licensure Policies,
Influence Adoption, 33 HEALTH AFFAIRS 207 (2014) (finding that states
which require out-of-state providers to have a special license to provide
telehealth have lower rates of telehealth services); Ameringer, supra note
113, at 57 (“But serious obstacles to the implementation of telemedicine
exist. Among the most significant of these are state-based licensure
schemes.”); Heather L. Daly, Telemedicine: The Invisible Legal Barriers
to the Health Care of the Future 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 73, 90 (2000)
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as four out of five states require health care providers to be licensed in
the state where the patient is located, so that health care providers who
provide telehealth to patients in multiple states must have separate
licenses for each state.118 Some states also require providers to have an
in-person consultation with the patient before providing services
remotely through telehealth.119 A health care provider who is licensed
in one state but practices in a state in which she does not have a license
may face loss or suspension of her license, civil damages, or criminal
penalties.120 In some states, in-state physicians may also be liable if they
seek a consultation from an out-of-state physician.121
(“[A]pplication requirements, inconsistencies in the laws applicable to
health care providers, and the lack of coordination make licensing an
effective barrier to the expansion of telemedicine.”); Diane E. Hoffman &
Virginia Rowthorn, Legal Impediments to the Diffusion of Telemedicine,
14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2011) (“State laws regarding
physician licensure present the greatest challenge to the interstate practice
of telemedicine.”); Peter D. Jacobson & Elizabeth Selvin, Licensing
Telemedicine: The Need for a National System, 6 TELEMEDICINE J. &
E-HEALTH 429, 431 (2000) (“The current state-based medical licensure
system may constitute one of the most significant barriers to the wide
dissemination of telemedicine.”); Safriet, Closing the Gap, supra note
100, at 315-316 (“[T]he crazy quilt of licensure laws has repeatedly been
identified as the greatest legal impediment to ‘telepractice’ or ‘telehealth’
systems that would allow HCPs [health care providers] to monitor,
diagnose, and treat patients at distant sites through telecommunications
technology”); Kathleen M. Vybomy, Legal and Political Issues Facing
Telemedicine, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 61, 66 (1996) (“Perhaps the most
significant barrier to a nationwide telemedical practice is the traditional
system of state-by-state physician licensing”). Other barriers to the
adoption of telehealth besides licensing include resistance from insurers to
reimburse providers for telehealth services, and resistance from providers
to offer them. Austin Frakt, You Mean I Don’t Have to Show Up? The
Promise
of
Telemedicine,
N.Y. TIMES (May
16,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/17/upshot/you-mean-i-dont-have-toshow-up-the-promise-of-telemedicine.html.
118. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, supra note 112, at 7-8.
119. Lustig, supra note 111, at 18. See, e.g., Teladoc Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd.,
112 F. Supp. 3d 529, 534 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (challenging a 2015 Texas
Medical Board rule requiring an in-person evaluation before a physician
could issue a prescription).
120. See Joy E. Matak, Note, Telemedicine: Medical Treatment Via
Telecommunications Will Save Lives, But Can Congress Answer the
Call?: Federal Preemption of State Licensure Requirements Under
Congressional Commerce Clause Authority & Spending Power, 22 VT. L.
REV. 231, 233 (1997); Thomas R. McLean, The Future of Telemedicine
and Its Faustian Reliance on Regulatory Trade Barriers for Protection,
16 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 463 (2006) (“[I]n the current market, when a
state finds a provider who uses cyberspace to avoid compliance with its
licensure act, that state will aggressively prosecute the provider.”).
121. Matak, supra note 120, at 242 (citations omitted).
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Although the basic education and training requirements for
physician licensure are similar across states, physicians face an array of
administrative and financial barriers to getting and maintaining licenses
in multiple states.122 For example, state licensing boards may require
that applicants complete additional testing or coursework; provide
references, transcripts, and a picture; pay fees; or participate in an inperson interview.123 Many states also require physicians to have medical
malpractice coverage in order to hold a license, so providers practicing
in multiple states may have to comply with multiple insurance codes.124
Fulfilling these procedures can be time-consuming and costly. These
factors may help to explain why, according to a 2010 HRSA report,
only 22% of licensed physicians hold multiple state licenses.125 Such
state-level requirements are also difficult to justify from a quality
perspective, since medical practice standards are evidence-based and
medical training standards are set nationally.126
State licensure presents even more formidable barriers for
professions such as nurses and physician assistants seeking to offer
services through telehealth, since they are subject as well to scope-ofpractice and supervision restrictions that vary widely by state.127 For
example, a nurse who can prescribe medications or diagnose patients
independently in one state may be subject to physician supervision
requirements in another. Providers must be careful to abide by the
specific scope-of-practice and supervision requirements in each state in
which they operate, or risk disciplinary sanctions. Applicants may also
have to wait a substantial amount of time for the licensing board to
process their application. For example, one report found that nursing
school graduates in California had to wait as long as 24 weeks for their
licenses to be processed, while experienced nurses from out-of-state also
waited for months to get a California license.128
122. Alison M. Sulentic, Crossing Borders: The Licensure of Interstate
Telemedicine Practitioners, 25 J. LEGIS. 1, 18 (1999).
123. Janet M. Torpy, Medical Licensure, 304 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1268, 1268
(2010).
124. See McLean, supra note 120, at 464.
125. MARY K. WAKEFIELD, HEALTH RES. & SERVICES ADMIN., TELEHEALTH
LICENSURE REPORT 1, 26 (2010).
126. See Robert Kocher et. al., Doctors Without State Borders: Practicing
Across State Lines, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/18/doctors-without-state-borderspracticing-across-state-lines/.
127. Sulentic, supra note 122, at 19 (“The barriers facing a nonphysican who
wishes to offer his services in a different state through telemedicine may
in fact be impossible to surmount.”).
128. Eryn Brown, Licensing Logjam for California Nurses, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (Aug. 17, 2016), http://khn.org/news/licensing-logjam-for-
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States have taken some limited steps to address these obstacles.
Most states have a “consultation exception” that allows out-of-state
health care providers to “‘practice medicine in that state at the behest
and in consultation with a referring physician’ practicing within the
state.”129 Other states allow out-of-state physicians to procure a
“limited license” or “special purpose” license for telemedicine, which
essentially allows out-of-state providers to provide a limited set of
services, such as teleradiology, without a full license.130 A few states
have taken more dramatic steps: for example, Alabama and
Pennsylvania have reciprocity agreements with other states, granting
in-state licenses to other states that accept their licenses.131 Yet on the
whole, these steps have been either too limited in scope or not
sufficiently widespread to remove the barriers that licensing presents
for telehealth.132
C.

Foreign-Trained Providers

Licensure also impedes access to care without improving quality by
subjecting nearly all foreign-trained health care providers to the same
burdensome licensing requirements, even if they are highly-trained and
experienced. State medical practice acts require that all medical
graduates seeking licensure no matter how well-trained and educated
they are, must overcome a daunting set of obstacles in order to practice
legally in the United States. These include passing the three steps of
the United States Medical Licensing Examination (a process which
usually takes years to complete and requires paying thousands of dollars
in fees) and completing a residency in the United States (which also
takes years and has a limited number of vacancies).133 States vary in
the length of the residency they require international medical graduates

california-nurses/ (“‘We can’t license our graduates,’ McFarland
lamented. ‘Nurses want to retire, they want to train the next generation.
We have hospitals investing in residency programs and they can’t start
the new nurses they want to hire. At the end of the day, who’s
suffering? Our nurse graduates and our patients.’”).
129. Zilis, supra note 87, at 208 (quoting Jon Linkous, Telemedicine and
State Licensure, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N (Apr. 19, 2010),
http://americantelemed.blogspot.com/2010/04/telemedicine-andstate-licensure.html).
130. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 10; Zilis, supra note 87, at 209-210.
131. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 87, at 16.
132. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 9-10.
133. See Brenton D. Peterson et al., Doctors with Borders: Occupational
Licensing as an Implicit Barrier to High Skill Migration, 160 PUB. CHOICE
45, 51 (2014); Fees and Payment, EDUC. COMM’N FOR FOREIGN MED.
GRADUATES, https://www.ecfmg.org/fees/index.html (Dec. 31, 2018).
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to complete in order to get a license.134 Only physicians who were
trained in Canada are exempt from having to complete a residency
again in the United States.135
This contrasts with the process in some other countries, which
allows foreign providers to obtain a license more easily if they meet
certain indicators of competency or training. For example, some
Canadian provinces allow immigrant physicians to practice family
medicine in the Canada without doing a residency there, if they
completed similar postgraduate work in certain other countries.136 New
Zealand automatically allows physicians from the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Canada to practice in New Zealand.137
The licensing process in the United States likely deters many highquality foreign-trained providers from practicing here.138 According to a
2014 report by former Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick’s
Advisory Council for Refugees and Immigrants, foreign-trained health
care providers “are 5 times more likely to be underemployed and twice
as likely to work in a different field than U.S.-trained providers.”139 One
of the report’s authors estimated that there could be more than 60,000
foreign-trained doctors living in the United States who are not licensed
to practice.140 Research finds that patients in the United States who are
cared for by international medical graduates have similar or better
outcomes than patients who are cared for by U.S. medical graduates.141
Foreign medical graduates disproportionately practice primary care and

134. Peterson et al., supra note 133.
135. Rampell, supra note 88.
136. Id.
137. McLean, supra note 120, at 504 (citing Med. Counsel of N.Z., Policy on
Registration in New Zealand (May 2004), http://www.mcnz.org.nz/
Default.aspx?tabid=983).
138. See Peterson et al., supra note 133, at 50; Simón Rios, For Doctors
Trained
Abroad,
Challenges
to
Practicing
Medicine
Often
Insurmountable, WBUR (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/
commonhealth/2016/09/30/foreign-trained-doctors-challenges.
139. GOVERNOR’S ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES & IMMIGRANTS TASK
FORCE ON IMMIGRANT HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS IN MASSACHUSETTS,
RX FOR STRENGTHENING MASSACHUSETTS’ ECONOMY AND HEALTHCARE
SYSTEM 1, 12 (2014).
140. Rios, supra note 138.
141. See, e.g., John J. Norcini et al., Evaluating the Quality of Care Provided
by Graduates of International Medical Schools, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1461,
1466-67 (2010); Yusake Tsugawa et al., Quality of Care Delivered by
General Internists in US Hospitals Who Graduated from Foreign Versus
US Medical Schools: Observational Study, 356 BRIT. MED. J. 1 (2017).
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practice in underserved communities in the United States that lack
adequate access to health care.142

III. A Federalist Approach
Over the past few years, the federal government has taken several
steps to improve access to health care by encouraging states to reform
their licensing requirements for health care providers. It has eased
licensing restrictions for health care providers working at military
hospitals and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), over which the
federal government has jurisdiction. It has provided funding for states
and professional bodies to improve access to telemedicine. The FTC has
stepped up its antitrust enforcement and advocacy efforts against
licensing boards that engage in anticompetitive conduct. Finally, the
ACA has indirectly placed pressure on states to implement further
reforms through expanding health insurance and promoting delivery
system reforms.
These measures represent a range of different federal-state
dynamics. For instance, the funding schemes fit into the classic
paradigm of “cooperative federalism,” in which the federal government
offers states fiscal support to enact certain desired reforms.143 By
contrast, the VA’s and FTC’s actions arguably represent more
substantial incursions onto states’ sovereignty. Yet none of these
measures attempts to coopt or preempt state’ authority over licensing
altogether. The section below describes each of these measures in more
detail, how they might improve access to health care, and the scope for
future efforts to build on this progress. Although the steps taken to
date have been somewhat ad hoc and limited, they can form the basis
for a coherent and effective general approach to a less costly and more
effective licensing system.

142. Amelia Goodfellow et al., Predictors of Primary Care Physician Practice
Location in Underserved Urban or Rural Areas in the United States: A
Systematic Literature Review, 91 ACAD. MED. 1313 (2016). This seems at
least in part attributable to the J1 visa-waiver program, which allows
foreign physicians to become eligible for green cards if they work for three
years in an area designated by HRSA as “Health Professional Shortage
Areas.” See Talia R. Kahn, et al., Retention of J-1 Visa Waiver Program
Physicians in Washington State’s Health Professional Shortage Areas, 85
ACAD. MED. 614, 614-615 (2010).
143. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 28, at 584 (referring to
Medicaid and SCHIP as “classic cooperative federalism programs”);
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of StateBased Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 122123 (2010) (“Conditional spending programs, such as Medicaid, are prime
examples of cooperative federalism.”).
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A.

Federal Licensing Changes

Although health care providers are licensed by the states, the
federal government exerts some limited authority over licenses for
providers who work as employees for federal government agencies such
as the VA. It has a history of using this authority to relax licensing
restrictions to improve access to health care for military and veteran
populations. For example, military health care providers (including
doctors, nurses, dentists, psychologists) who have a license can work in
a military hospital without obtaining a license in the state in which the
specific facility they are working at is located.144 Other federal programs,
such as the Veterans Administration, the Indian Health Service, and
the Public Health Service have similar programs.145
In recent years, the federal government has increasingly used this
power to ease licensing restrictions with the aim of improving provider
mobility and increasing telehealth utilization. In 2011, Congress passed
the Servicemembers’ Telemedicine & E-Health Portability (STEP) Act,
which expanded the existing state licensure exemption for health care
professionals treating Department of Defense (DOD) patients to
“include qualified DOD civilians and personal service contractors” and
to remove the requirement that care for service members be delivered
in a military facility.146 A 2016 memorandum from the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs for the Department of Defense
further enlarged this exemption by applying it to health care providers
in TRICARE (the civilian health care program for service members and
their dependents)147 and clarifying that telemedicine services could be
delivered at the patient’s home.148 In 2018, the VA promulgated a rule

144. See Sulentic, supra note 122, at 36 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1094(d)-(e)(1)).
145. Id.; see, e.g., VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., VHA HANDBOOK 1100.19 (2012),
at 14 (“Applicants being credentialed in preparation for applying for
clinical privileges must possess at least one full, active, current, and
unrestricted license that authorizes the licensee to practice in the state of
licensure and outside VA without any change being needed in the status
of the license.”).
146. One Page Summary on the H.R. 1832, the STEP Act, U.S. CONGRESSMAN
GLENN ‘GT’ THOMPSON, https://thompson.house.gov/sites/thompson.
house.gov/files/One%20Page%20Summary%20on%20the%20STEP%20A
ct.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2019).
147. About Us, TRICARE, https://www.tricare.mil/About (last visited Nov. 25,
2018).
148. Ellen L. Janos & Carrie Roll, U.S. Department of Defense Expands
Telemedicine Access for Military Members, MINTZ (Mar. 8, 2016),
https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2016-03-usdepartment-defense-expands-telemedicine-access-military.
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allowing VA health care providers to deliver care through telehealth
regardless of where the provider or patient is located.149
The VA has also used its regulatory authority to relax scope-ofpractice restrictions for APNs in VA facilities. In 2016, the VA finalized
regulations granting “full practice authority” for three categories of
APNs—Nurse Practitioners, Clinical Nurse Specialists, and Certified
Nurse-Midwives.150 This rule expanded the scope of the services that
these professionals can offer, for example, clarifying that Certified NPs
have the authority to take patient histories, provide physical exams,
order laboratory images, and prescribe medications.151 The rule also
expressly preempts conflicting state laws that circumscribe APNs’ scope
of practice when they are working at the VA.152 The goal of the
regulation is to “[increase] veterans’ access to VA health care by
expanding the pool of qualified health care professionals who are
authorized to provide primary health care and other related health care
services to the full extent of their education, training, and certification,
without the clinical supervision of physicians.”153
Although no empirical research has yet assessed the impacts of
these measures, they have the potential to improve access to care for
service members, veterans, and their dependents.154 These regulatory
changes affect a sizable number of people: the VA alone serves over six
million patients each year and is the nation’s largest employer of
nurses.155
These recent measures loosely fit what Abbe Gluck calls “fieldclaiming federalism,” which “denotes a set of small moves that
149. Authority of Health Care Providers to Practice Telehealth, 83 Fed. Reg.
21897 (May 11, 2018) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 17).
150. Nursing Services, 38 C.F.R. § 17.415 (2016).
151. Id. The proposed rule would have also encompassed a fourth category of
APNs, certified registered nurse anesthetists, but the VA revised its
proposal to leave them out after the proposed rule was met with intense
opposition from anesthesiologists. Virgil Dickson, VA Finalizes Rule that
Expands Scope of Nurse Practice, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Dec. 13, 2016),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20161213/NEWS/161219974.
152. 38 C.F.R. pt. 17 (2016).
153. Id.
154. Charlie Reed, Telehealth Offers Hopes for Better Access to Specialists,
Lower
Costs,
STARS
&
STRIPES,
(Mar.
21,
2013),
https://www.stripes.com/news/telehealth-offers-hopes-for-better-accessto-specialists-lower-costs-1.212850#.WV_Ay02Wy71.
155. VA Grants Full Practice Authority to Advance Practice Registered
Nurses, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS (Dec. 14, 2016, 2:05 PM),
https://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2847;
Veterans
Health Administration: About VHA, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS,
https://www.va.gov/health/aboutVHA.asp (last updated Dec. 27, 2018).
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announce the federal government’s entry into an area of traditional
state authority.”156 The fit is not perfect: instead of announcing the
federal government’s entry into health licensing, these policies have
incrementally expanded existing federal authority over health licensing
requirements.157 Yet these policies may still have “boundary-shifting”
significance. Both the VA rules and the STEP Act are limited measures
and mostly preserve states’ control over licensing, but may “pave[] the
way for further and more extensive [federal] regulation.”158 Indeed, some
supporters of these measures have even hailed them as a potential first
step for Congress on the path toward enacting national telemedicine
legislation that applies to all health care providers.159
B.

Fiscal Support

Congress has taken a series of small steps to provide fiscal support
to incentivize states to reform their licensing regimes to improve access
to care. In 2002, Congress passed a law which authorized the Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) to award grants to
state licensing boards to encourage cooperation and reduce barriers to
telemedicine.160 The 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) created additional funding for the purpose of making licenses
more portable across state lines.161 The 2010 ACA established the
National Health Care Workforce Commission and authorized a series of
grants to states to address health care workforce issues, with a
particular focus on licensure portability,162 though Congress never
appropriated the money requested by the Obama Administration to
fund the commission.163
HRSA’s Licensure Portability Grant Program has contributed to
an important and under-appreciated development: the formation of a
156. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 28, at 587.
157. In addition, unlike the measures on which Gluck focuses, these ones do
not give states the option of opting out of these provisions. See id. at 573.
158. Id. at 587.
159. See Meredith Lawrence, DoD STEP Act – A Model for Public
Healthcare?, WORK SPACE TODAY (Aug. 1, 2013, 1:04 PM),
http://theworkspacetoday.com/2013/08/01/dod-step-act-a-model-forpublic-healthcare/.
160. Health Care Safety Net Amendments of 2002, Pub L. No. 107-251, § 102
(2002); WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 2.
161. WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 17.
162. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 5101, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 2.
163. Peter I. Buerhaus & Sheldon M. Retchin, The Dormant National Health
Care Workforce Commission Needs Congressional Funding to Fulfill its
Promise, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 2021, 2022 (2013).
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number of “interstate compacts” for health care professionals. These
interstate compacts are regulatory agreements among states and
professional organizations aimed at making it easier for providers to
relocate from one state to another and to ease the barriers to
telehealth.164
The first such compact was the Nurse Licensure Compact (NLC),
developed by the National Council of State Boards of Nursing (NCSBN)
in the 1990s and implemented in 2000.165 The NLC permits certain types
of nurses in participating states to practice across state lines, either
electronically or in person, without obtaining a new license.166 It uses a
system of “mutual recognition,” in which a nurse located in a state that
has adopted the NLC may acquire a single multi-state license that
allows him or her to practice in any other state that has adopted the
NLC.167 Of note, the NLC does not obviate all licensing barriers to
interstate practice. For instance, nurses must still comply with the
scope-of-practice regime in the state in which they are practicing.168
Although the compact was developed before the establishment of
HRSA’s Licensure Portability Grant Program, the NCSBN later
received funding from the program to “[pursue] a range of activities to
overcome the barriers to adopting the NLC.”169 Currently 25 states
participate in the NLC,170 and in 2015, the NCSBN developed a similar
compact for APNs, who were not included in the original agreement.171
164. WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 9, 48. See generally Jill Elaine Hasday,
Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of
Permanency, 49 FLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (evaluating the democratic
implications of interstate compacts); Matthew Pincus, When Should
Interstate Compacts Require Congressional Consent?, 42 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 511, 513-14 (2009) (examining current doctrine concerning
when interstate compacts require Congressional consent and proposing a
new jurisprudential standard).
165. Sandra Evans, The Nurse Licensure Compact:
Perspective, J. NURS. REG., Oct. 2015, at 11.

A

166. NLC
FAQs,
NAT’L
COUNCIL
S T.
BOARDS
https://www.ncsbn.org/94.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2018).

Historical
NURSING,

167. Nurse Licensure Compact: What Nurse Employers Need to Knows, NAT’L
COUNCIL
S T.
BOARDS
NURSING,
https://www.ncsbn.org/
NLCA_Employers_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2019).
168. Nurse
Licensure
Compact
FAQ,
N.H.
BOARD
NURSING,
https://www.oplc.nh.gov/nursing/faq-nurse-compact.htm#scope
(last
visited Sept. 22, 2017).
169. WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 16.
170. Updated Map: Enhanced Nursing Licensure Compact (eNLC) May. 2018,
NURSE (May 23, 2018), https://nurse.org/articles/enhanced-compactmulti-state-license-eNLC/.
171. APRN
Compact, NAT’L COUNCIL STATE BOARDS NURSING,
https://www.ncsbn.org/aprn-compact.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
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HRSA’s Licensure Portability Grant Program also supported the
development of a similar interstate compact for physicians, the
Interstate Medical Licensure Compact (IMLC).172 The IMLC was
developed by the Federation of State Medical Boards—an umbrella
organization representing the various state medical and osteopathic
licensing boards—and has been adopted in 25 states as of January
2019.173 Unlike the NLC, the IMLC still requires physicians in
participating states to acquire a separate license for each state in which
they practice, but it aims to make it easier for them to do so.174
In addition to nurses and physicians, a number of other health care
professions have begun to form similar arrangements. Separate
compacts are being developed for social workers, physical and
occupational therapists, emergency medical services, psychologists,
mental health counselors, pharmacists, and dentists.175 While it remains
to be seen how effectively these compacts will ease the adoption of
telehealth services and improve interstate mobility, they represent one
potential means of improving access to health care.176
So far, the amount of federal funding provided to the states for
licensing reform has been fairly minimal and narrowly targeted, and
some scholars have urged the federal government to adopt a more
172. Federal Grant Awarded to Support State Medical Boards in Developing
Infrastructure for Interstate Medical Licensure Compact, FED’N STATE
MED. BOARDS (July 17, 2015), http://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/
advocacy/news-releases/2015/compact-commission-grant.pdf.
173. Michigan Joins Interstate Medical Licensure Compact, FED’N STATE MED.
BOARDS
(Jan.
8,
2019),
http://www.fsmb.org/advocacy/newsreleases/michigan-joins-interstate-medical-licensure-compact/.
174. Humayun J. Chaudhry et al., Improving Access and Mobility – The
Interstate Medical Licensure Compact, 372 NEW ENG. J MED. 1581 (2015).
175. National Center for Interstate Compacts, COUNCIL STATE GOV’TS,
http://apps.csg.org/ncic/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2017); Michael Ollove,
Make Doctor’s Licenses Like Driver’s Licenses? Medical Groups Say No,
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org
/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/12/11/make-doctorslicenses-like-drivers-licenses-medical-groups-say-no.
176. Christina DePasquale & Kevin Stange, Labor Supply Effects of
Occupational Regulation: Evidence from the Nurse Licensure Compact
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22344, 2016)
(finding that the adoption of the Nurse Licensure Compact did not
have any significant impacts on mobility); Anna Louie Sussman,
Occupational Licensing Doesn’t Seem to Restrict Nurses’ Mobility, WALL
ST. J. (July 22, 2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/
07/22/occupational-licensing-doesnt-seem-to-restrict-nurses-mobility/
(“Morris Kleiner, a University of Minnesota economist who has studied
licensing extensively, offered a complementary explanation: Nurses’
interstate migration is less affected by licensing than other licensed
professionals”).
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ambitious program. Economist Morris Kleiner has proposed a
competition modeled on the Department of Education’s “Race to the
Top” program.177 Others have proposed that the federal government
utilize Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement as levers to influence
states’ licensing schemes.178
These fiscal incentives largely fit into the classic mode of
“cooperative federalism,” in which the federal government provides the
states with fiscal support on the condition that they enact certain
federal policy goals.179 Yet such measures can be more or less
prescriptive, depending on how they are designed.180 To the extent that
the government adopts a more prescriptive approach, it would have to
be careful not to run afoul of the Supreme Court’s holding in NFIB v.
Sebelius that sufficiently coercive federal financial incentives can violate
the Constitution.181
C.

Antitrust Remedies

Another way that the federal government has influence over state
licensing laws is through antitrust enforcement. Although the FTC has
long criticized states’ occupational licensing laws as harmful and
anticompetitive,182 until recently its power to challenge these laws has
been hamstrung as state licensing boards have generally been assumed
to be immune from federal antitrust scrutiny.183 This changed in 2015

177. Kleiner et al., A Proposal, supra note 14, at 18-19.
178. See, e.g., Safriet Impediments, supra note 96, at 316; Barbara J. Safriet,
Health Care Dollars and Regulatory Sense: The Role of Advanced Practice
Nursing, 9 YALE J. REG. 417, 481-482 (1992) [hereinafter Safriet, Health
Care Dollars].
179. Leonard, supra note 143, at 122-123 (“Conditional spending programs,
such as Medicaid, are prime examples of cooperative federalism.”).
180. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National
Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 885
(2009); SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 244.
181. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012).
182. See, e.g., COX & FOSTER, supra note 46; FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T
JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION (2004).
183. Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1099 (“Despite wide recognition of the
potential for economic harm associated with allowing professions to
control their licensing rules and define the scope of their art, real reform
is elusive. Part of the reason is that, in the professional licensing context,
the most powerful legal tool against anticompetitive activity appears
unavailable. Most jurisdictions interpret antitrust federalism to shield
licensing boards from the Sherman Act despite the fact that the boards
often look and act like § 1’s principal target.”); Sanderson, supra note 69,
at 469 (Although “the FTC has repeatedly taken on occupational licensing
schemes . . . its successes have been minor and marginal; on the core issue
of whether the Sherman Act or Federal Trade Commission Act can be
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when the Supreme Court held in North Carolina Board of Dental
Examiners v. FTC (hereafter North Carolina Dental Examiners) that
state licensing boards are not automatically immune from federal
antitrust scrutiny.184
The dispute underlying North Carolina Dental Examiners began
simmering in the early 2000s, when non-dentist providers began offering
teeth-whitening services in North Carolina and charging lower prices
than dentists had been charging.185 The North Carolina State Board of
Dental Examiners, a state licensing board composed primarily of
dentists, became aware of this trend, and issued a number of cease-anddesist letters to the non-dentist providers, charging that teethwhitening constituted the “practice of dentistry.”186 The Board’s actions
were successful, and the non-dentists ceased offering teeth-whitening in
the state.187 Thereafter, the FTC filed an administrative complaint
against the Board, charging that its actions constituted anticompetitive conduct in violation the Federal Trade Commission Act.188
In response, the Board claimed that because it was a state agency, it
was immune from antitrust law under the “state action” doctrine.189
The legal issue in North Carolina Dental Examiners concerned
whether state licensing boards enjoy antitrust immunity under the state
action doctrine. First established by the Supreme Court in 1943 in
Parker v. Brown, the idea undergirding the state action doctrine is
“that Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, could not have intended
to prohibit all state economic regulation that displaces competition.”190
In the decades that followed Parker v. Brown, lower courts had
difficulty determining the parameters of this holding.191 Because states
frequently govern by delegating regulatory authority to private
citizens,192 the Court later provided in California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., that private entities enjoy state-action
immunity if they meet two conditions: (1) if their conduct is “clearly
used against state protectionism, the FTC’s defeat has been almost
total.”).
184. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015).
185. Id. at 1108.
186. Id. at 1107-08.
187. Id. at 1108.
188. Id. at 1108-09.
189. Id. at 1109.
190. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943); Sherman Act--State-Action
Immunity--North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 129
Harv. L. Rev. 371 (2015).
191. Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1119-1120.
192. Id.
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articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy;” and (2) is
“‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.”193 The Supreme Court
subsequently held that some government entities—including
municipalities—only needed to meet the first standard to enjoy
antitrust immunity, because there is a presumption that they operate
in the public interest.194
Until recently, most courts and commentators assumed that state
agencies, including licensing boards, were included in this category of
government entities and thus that they were essentially immune from
antitrust scrutiny.195 However, the Supreme Court had not directly
addressed whether state agencies, including professional licensing
boards, were subject to the second, “active supervision” requirement.196
In its 2015 ruling, the Supreme Court held that “a state board on
which a controlling number of decisionmakers are active market
participants in the occupation the board regulates must satisfy Midcal’s
active supervision requirement in order to invoke state-action antitrust
immunity.”197 The Court reasoned that because the dental board was
controlled by dentists and there was no evidence of “active supervision”
from the state, it was effectively a private actor and not immune from
antitrust scrutiny under the state action doctrine.198
In the wake of North Carolina Dental Examiners, a number of
states have enacted new oversight standards in an attempt to satisfy
the “active supervision” requirement and immunize their boards against
antitrust scrutiny. States have taken different approaches: for example,
Governor Bentley of Alabama issued an executive order requiring an
executive branch agency or official to oversee state licensing boards;199
Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin issued an order requiring its attorney
193. California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et
al., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.)).
194. Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985) (“We may presume, absent a
showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the public
interest.”).
195. Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1121-1125; see Neil Katsuyama, The
Economics of Occupational Licensing: Applying Antitrust Economics to
Distinguish Between Beneficial and Anticompetitive Professional
Licenses, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 565, 569 (2010); Einer Richard
Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 693
(1991); Earles v. State Board of Certified Public Accountants of
Louisiana, 139 F.3d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1988).
196. Edlin & Haw, supra note 44, at 1124.
197. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015).
198. Id. at 1116.
199. Ala. Exec. Order No. 7 (2015), https://nasba.org/app/uploads/2018/
05/872.pdf.
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general’s office to oversee state licensing boards;200 the Arkansas
Legislature passed a bill entrusting oversight of its licensing rules to a
legislative subcommittee;201 and the Georgia Legislature gave its
governor the direct authority to veto or modify its licensing boards’
decision.202
In theory, states could also try to insulate their licensing boards
from antitrust scrutiny, either “by creating regulatory boards that serve
only in an advisory capacity, or by staffing a regulatory board
exclusively with persons who have no financial interest in the
occupation that is being regulated.”203 Yet, at least so far, states appear
to be more focused on satisfying the active supervision requirement.204
Professor Rebecca Haw Allensworth has characterized this new state of
affairs as “the new antitrust federalism,” in which antitrust immunity
is conditioned “not on the fact of state regulation but on the process of
regulation.”205
The reverberations of North Carolina Dental Examiners are still
being felt, and the extent to which such institutional changes will affect
substantive licensing standards is still unclear. Many observers have
expressed skepticism that the bar established by the Court will in
practice constrain licensing boards from engaging in anticompetitive
conduct or substantively alter states’ licensing regimes.206 That being
200. Okla. Exec. Order No. 2015-33 (2015). Retrieved from www.sos.ok.gov
/documents/executive/993.pdf.
201. ARK. CODE ANN. § 10-3-309 (2016).
202. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1C-3(a) (2016).
203. FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE SUPERVISION OF
STATE REGULATORY BOARDS CONTROLLED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS
(2015). See also Allensworth, supra note 3, at 1601 (arguing that “altering
professional dominance on boards may be an attractive alternative to
supervision . . . ”).
204. Suzanne Weiss, States are Re-Examining the Way They Regulate a
Variety of Occupations, ST. LEGIS. MAG. (Jan. 1, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/bookstore/state-legislatures-magazine/licensed-tolabor636179334.aspx. See also Nicole Livanos, State Board Shake-Up:
Legislative Action in the Wake of North Carolina Board of Dental
Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 J. NUR. REG. 60 (2016).
205. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The New Antitrust Federalism, 102 VA. L.
REV. 1387, 1387 (2016).
206. Herbert Hovenkamp, Rediscovering Capture: Antitrust Federalism and
the North Carolina Dental Case, 4 CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 1, 16
(2015) (“The standard that the Supreme Court has developed is actually
not all that high. The final decision must come from a government
decision-maker with power to review and disapprove, but largely under
any standard that the state wishes to articulate. What the state cannot
do, however, is simply paste the label ‘sovereign’ or ‘agency’ on a purely
private actor.”); David Hyman & Shirley Svorny, If Professions Are Just
“Cartels by Another Name,” What Should We Do About It?, 163 U. PA.
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said, the Court’s decision has clearly increased licensing boards’ liability
and subjected them to greater scrutiny: so far, it has triggered dozens
of lawsuits from current or prospective licensees, most of which have
been settled or dismissed.207
The FTC is also intensifying its efforts to challenge boards’ anticompetitive conduct.208 For example, in 2016 the FTC and the
Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief in favor of a
telemedicine company’s challenge to a series of regulations adopted by
the Texas Medical Board restricting telehealth services in that state.209
In addition to litigation, the FTC has also stepped up its advocacy
efforts directed at state legislatures, particularly with regard to scope
of practice for APNs.210 Between January 2010 and November 2015, the
L. REV. ONLINE 101, 112 (2015) (“Although active supervision may
restrain some state licensing boards from engaging in some
anticompetitive conduct, we are skeptical that it will actually do all that
much to address the problems cataloged by Professors Edlin and Haw.”);
Joseph Sanderson, North Carolina Board: Much Ado About Nothing,
YALE
J.
REG.:
NOTICE
&
COMMENT
(Mar.
4,
2015),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/north-carolina-board-much-ado-about-nothingby-joseph-m-sanderson-2/ (“[W]hile North Carolina Board may have
some effects on the margins, the broad landscape is largely unchanged.”);
Schleicher, supra note 21, at 122 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s
decision as “a minor move against occupational licenses.”). For a more
optimistic view, see William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Antitrust as
Disruptive Innovation in Health Care: Can Limiting State Action
Immunity Help Save a Trillion Dollars?, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 723 (2017)
(arguing that the decision has the potential to be a “disruptive
innovation” that will make health care markets more efficient).
207. Allensworth, supra note 3, at 1582 (describing these lawsuits and arguing
that “[t]hese suits not only expose states to significant financial liability,
but they threaten to unravel the way that the occupations have been
regulated for decades.”); Weiss, supra note 204.
208. Fazal Khan, The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The Forthcoming Legal
Storm over Mobile Health Technology’s Impact on the Medical Profession,
26 HEALTH MATRIX 123, 162 (2016) (“[W]ith the Court validating that
state licensing boards cannot automatically rely on state action immunity,
the future portends a more aggressive FTC going after more state boards
for anti-competitive regulations in the medical licensing and scope of
practice arena.”).
209. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellee, Teladoc Inc. et. al. v. Texas
Medical Board, et. al., No. 16-50017 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 2016).
210. Maureen Ohlhausen, Beyond Law Enforcement: The FTC’s Role in
Promoting Health Care Competition and Innovation, HEALTH AFFAIRS
BLOG (Jan. 26, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/01/26/beyondlaw-enforcement-the-ftcs-role-in-promoting-health-care-competition-andinnovation/; Khan, supra note 208, at 152 (“The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has become increasingly involved in advocating for
less restrictive scope of practice laws. In the wake of the Institute of
Medicine’s report on nursing and given expanded insurance coverage
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FTC filed fifteen advocacy comments with state legislatures on scope
of practice issues, and published a report on scope of practice issues for
APNs.211 In 2017, it also formed a new “Economic Liberty Task Force,”
which has focused in large part on occupational licensing.212
D.

The Affordable Care Act

Although the ACA explicitly preserves state authority in certain
areas, including occupational licensing, 213 it indirectly created
substantial pressure for states, licensing boards, and professional
associations to reshape occupational regulations. It did so in two main
ways. First, by dramatically expanding the number of Americans who
have health insurance, the ACA accentuated concerns that there would
be a shortage in the supply of physicians—and in particular, primary
care physicians—in the United States to provide care for the newly
insured, who tend to use health care services at a higher rate than the
uninsured.214 In response, many scholars and policymakers proposed

under the ACA’s individual mandate, many states that still require
collaboration agreements are revisiting the practice”).
211. Andrew I. Gavil & Tara Isa Koslov, A Flexible Health Care Workforce
Requires a Flexible Regulatory Environment: Promoting Health Care
Competition Through Regulatory Reform, 91 WASH. L. REV. 147, 183
(2016).
212. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Launches New Website
Dedicated to Economic Liberty (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2017/03/ftc-launches-new-website-dedicatedeconomic-liberty. But see Vaheesan & Pasquale, supra note 15 (arguing
that the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission should
not prioritize policing occupational regulations, and that current antitrust
framework’s emphasis on efficiency is ill-suited to evaluating occupational
licensing regimes).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(d) (2018); Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note
28, at 582 (“We see that philosophy in . . . areas in which Congress chose
not to regulate at all, leaving matters such as doctor licensing to the
exclusive and historical province of state regulation.”).
214. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 57, 63 (2015) (“Policymakers’ greatest immediate concern is a
coming ‘doc shortage,’ especially a shortage of primary-care physicians,
who were in short supply even before the ACA’s enactment.”); Annie
Lowrey & Robert Pear, Doctor Shortage Likely to Worsen with Health
Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, at A1; Michael Ollove, Are There Enough
Doctors For The Newly Insured?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 3, 2014),
https://khn.org/news/doctor-shortage-primary-care-specialist/;
Elisabeth Rosenthal, The Health Care Waiting Game: Long Waits for
Doctors’ Appointments Have Become the Norm, N.Y. TIMES (July 6,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/sunday-review/long-waitsfor-doctors-appointments-have-become-the-norm.html.
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expanding scope-of-practice restrictions for APNs in order to meet this
rising demand.215
Second, the ACA contained a number of “delivery system” reforms
aimed at making the delivery of health care more efficient. These
included increased support for certain care delivery models, such as
Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) and nurse-managed health
clinics (NMHCs), which allow NPs to play larger roles in care
delivery.216 This emphasis on expanding roles for non-physician
practitioners has in turn placed additional scrutiny on licensing boards’
efforts to restrict practitioners’ scopes of practice.217
These reforms have coincided with—and likely contributed to—
tangible changes in states’ licensing regimes.218 Since the beginning of
215. Thomas S. Bodenheimer & Mark D. Smith, Primary Care: Proposed
Solutions to The Physician Shortage Without Training More Physicians,
32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1881, 1884 (2013); Linda V. Green et al., Primary
Care Physician Shortages Could Be Eliminated Through Use of Teams,
Nonphysicians, and Electronic Communication, 32 HEALTH AFF. 11, 16
(2013); Peter D. Jacobson & Shelley A. Jazowski, Physicians, the
Affordable Care Act, and Primary Care: Disruptive Change or Business
as Usual?, 26(8) J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 934, 934-35 (2011) (“Historically,
the United States has fluctuated between projected physician shortfalls
and surpluses. With the passage of the ACA, the nation will face a
physician shortage in the coming decades . . . expanding the role of NPPs
as primary care practitioners is probably the most immediate strategy for
alleviating the primary care shortage”); Uwe E. Reinhardt, James
Madison Professor of Econ. and Pub. Affairs, Transcript of statement
before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Lab., Educ. & Pensions entitled
‘30 Million New Patients and 11 Months to Go: Who Will Provide Their
Primary
Care?,
113th
Cong.
3
(2013),
available
at
https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Reinhardt.pdf.
216. See J. Margo Brooks Carthon et al., Federal Policies Influence Access to
Primary Care and Nurse Practitioner Workforce, 11(5) J. NURSE PRAC.
527, 528 (2015). See also Richard S. Saver, Health Law’s Uneasy
Relationship with Delivery System Innovation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK U.S.
HEALTH L. 659, 665-666 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman, and William
M. Sage eds., 1st ed., Oxford University Press 2017) (“The Affordable
Care Act’s initiatives to increase the number of nurses in clinical practice
generally and demonstration grants for nurse practitioner training
programs favor delivery models like retail clinics that depend heavily on
nurse practitioner staffing.”).
217. FURROW ET AL., supra note 43, at 4 (“The Affordable Care Act fosters
expanded roles for continuity of care, accessible preventive care, and
management of chronic illness at a lower cost. The activities of the
licensure boards in restricting the work of these professionals are coming
under increased scrutiny.”).
218. See Gabriel Scheffler, The Dynamism of Health Law: Expanded Insurance
Coverage as the Engine of Regulatory Reform 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020); Johnson, supra note 41, at 504 (“The great concern
over the shortage of primary care physicians to meet these goals is . . .
fostering a push to expand practice opportunities for [APNs and PAs].”);
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2010, the year the ACA was signed into law, ten states have expanded
their scope-of-practice regimes for NPs to “Full Practice,” bringing the
total number to 22 states and DC (as of June 2017).219 Although there
were likely many different factors that contributed to these changes,
advocates and policymakers who pushed for the reforms in these states
have cited concerns about not having enough health care providers to
meet the rising demand for health care brought about by the ACA.220
For example, the National Governors Association issued a policy paper
proposing that states reexamine their scope of practice laws for NPs, in
part to meet the rising demand for health care due to the ACA.221
Advocates of interstate compacts also cited concerns about the ACA’s
insurance expansion leading to a shortage of health care providers.222
Although the connection between the ACA and occupational
licensing may seem attenuated, this is not the first time that expanding
STUART H. ALTMAN ET AL., ASSESSING PROGRESS ON
MEDICINE REPORT THE FUTURE OF NURSING 5 (2016).

THE INSTITUTE OF

219. AM. ASS’N NURSE PRAC., supra note 101.
220. See, e.g., Catherine Dower et al., It is Time to Restructure Health
Professions Scope-of-Practice Regulations to Remove Barriers to Care,
32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1971, 1971 (2013) (“With the ACA’s expansion of
access to health care services, there is increasing interest in scope of
practice—that is, what services may be provided by which health
professions under what conditions. Scope-of-practice laws limit the bounds
of professional practice for many providers. According to the Scope of
Practice Legislation Tracking Database, established by the National
Conference of State Legislatures, nearly 1,800 practice act–related bills
were proposed in the United States between January 2011 and December
2012; of these, almost 350, or 20 percent, were adopted.”); Lydia DePillis,
In a Fight Between Nurses and Doctors, the Nurses are Slowly Winning,
WASH. POST. (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2016/03/18/in-a-fight-between-nurses-and-doctors-the-nursesare-slowly-winning/ (“For Beth Baldwin, president of the West Virginia
Nurses Association, the measure was aimed at meeting the needs of people
who live in rural areas where the nearest physicians might be miles away
— especially as the Affordable Care Act has expanded the pool of those
with access to insurance.”); Christine Vestal, Nurse Practitioners Slowly
Gain Autonomy, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 19, 2013),
http://khn.org/news/stateline-nurse- practitioners-scope-of-practice/
(“The need for the law, advocates say, was urgent, particularly
because Sandoval welcomed the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid
expansion in his state, one of only six Republican governors to do so”).
221. The Role of Nurse Practitioners in Meeting Increasing Demand for
Primary Care, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (Dec. 20, 2012),
https://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1212NursePractitione
rsPaper.pdf.
222. See, e.g., Chaudhry et al., supra note 174, at 1581-1582; Nurse Licensure
Compact, NAT’L COUNCIL STATE BOARDS OF NURSING (Apr. 8, 2016),
https://www.ncsbn.org/2016NLC_JPuente.pdf.

334

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming
Occupational Licensing

access to health care services has coincided with policymakers
liberalizing regulatory barriers for health care providers. For example,
the enactment of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965 led to similar concerns
about a shortage of primary care physicians, which in turn contributed
to the development of the first nurse practitioner programs.223
Further increasing the demand for health care and changing how
care is delivered could add to the pressure to liberalize licensing
requirements. Professor Barbara Safriet has argued that one way to
place pressure on state licensing boards is to amend Medicaid and
Medicare to ensure that APNs are eligible for reimbursement for
services that they are equipped to provide, even if those services fall
outside states’ scope-of-practice laws.224 Professor Fazal Khan predicts
that developments in mobile health care will “dramatically tilt the
balance of power” in legislative battles over licensing, in the same way
that Uber resulted in relaxed municipal licensing barriers for taxi
services, and notes that so far “the federal government seems to have
gone out of its way to promote this industry.”225
* * *
Although this paper focuses on the federal government’s licensing
reform efforts with respect to health care providers, the federal
government has recently taken a few steps that apply to non-health
care fields as well. For instance, it has used its limited power over
federal licenses to limit barriers for people with criminal records: in
2016, the Obama Administration issued an executive order to federal
agencies to limit federal licensing restrictions that apply to people with
criminal records, as part of a broader suite of actions designed to help
223. See, e.g., John Michael O’Brien, How Nurse Practitioners Obtained
Provider Status: Lessons for Pharmacists, 60 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS.
PHARMACY 2301 (2003); Safriet, Health Care Dollars, supra note 178, at
431-432.
224. Safriet, Health Care Dollars, supra note 178, at 481.
225. Khan, supra note 208, at 125, 162. See also FURROW ET AL., supra note
43, at 4 (“Three major factors are having a growing impact on the
structure and practice of professional licensure. These are the expansion
and accessibility of information concerning quality and outcomes of health
care; a significant shift in approach to defining the standard of care; and
public policy and payment supports for expanded roles for non-physician
health care professionals.”); Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health
Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1173, 1200 (2014) (arguing that
“contrary to prevailing sentiment, Congress and federal regulators are
facilitating rather than stifling mobile health technologies”). See
generally Matthew Wansley, Virtuous Capture, 67 ADMIN L. REV. 419,
422 (2015) (contending that “[i]n some cases, political actors can and
should use interest groups—by altering their power and incentives—
to pursue public interested regulatory goals”).
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incorporate ex-offenders into society.226 It has directed additional federal
funding to states: in 2017, the U.S. Labor Department awarded 7.5
million dollars to the National Conference of State Legislatures lead a
coalition of 10 states to reduce barriers to labor market entry and
“[i]mprove portability for selected occupational licenses across state
lines.”227 Finally, although the FTC has been especially involved in
health licensing issues, 228 it has taken actions in other fields as well,
including submitting public comments on state legislation and litigation
that would affect licensing for attorneys, interior designers, and casket
salesmen.229 In addition, it is at least possible to imagine comparable
federal reforms in non-health care fields (such as expanding legal
insurance) that would increase demand for a service or change how it
is delivered, which in turn would increase pressure on licensing regimes
in these fields.

IV. The Inadequacy of Alternative Approaches
Over the years, scholars and policymakers have advanced a variety
of alternative proposals to reform state licensing for health care
providers. These proposals vary both in the substance of their
recommendations and the level of government at which they are aimed.
Some reform proposals are addressed primarily to state policymakers,
while others are addressed to the federal government, and call for it to
226. Presidential Memorandum -- Promoting Rehabilitation and
Reintegration of Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, Press Release,
OFF. PRESS SECRETARY (Apr. 29, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/29/presidential-memorandumpromoting-rehabilitation-and-reintegration; Fact Sheet: President
Obama Announces New Actions to Reduce Recidivism and Promote
Reintegration of Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, OFF. PRESS
SECRETARY (June 24, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/
the-press- office/2016/06/24/fact-sheet-president-obama-announces-newactions-reduce-recidivism-and.
227. US Labor Department Awards $7.5M to Fund Research for Improving
Geographic Mobility For Workers In Licensed Occupations, U.S.
DEP’T LAB., (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases
/eta/eta20170112-0; Notice of Intent to Fund Project on Occupational
Licensing Review and Portability: NOI-ETA-16-14, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
https://www.doleta.gov/grants/pdf/NOI-ETA-16-14.pdf (last visited
Jan. 3, 2019).
228. See, e.g., Ohlhausen, supra note 210, (“Not surprisingly, a significant
portion of the FTC’s competition advocacy work is focused on the
health care sector.”).
229. Selected Advocacy Relating to Occupational Licensing, FED. TRADE
COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/economic-liberty/
selected- advocacy-relating-occupational-licensing (last visited Sept.
26, 2017).
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preempt state licensing laws. For the most part, however, such
proposals largely ignore—or devote only cursory attention to—how the
solutions they propose will overcome the same political dynamics which
at least some of them acknowledge as being responsible for the
deficiencies in our current system.230
This section outlines some of these proposals and explores why a
federalist approach is more likely to succeed. It concludes that states
are unlikely to implement major reforms to their own licensing regimes
without any federal intervention, due to lack of incentives to
experiment, the presence of externalities, and collective action
problems. It also concludes that a federalist approach is more feasible
than outright federal preemption, given interest group opposition and
Congressional norms, and that a federalist approach has important
functional advantages as well.
A.

Alternative Reform Proposals
1.

State Reform Proposals

Over the years, there have been numerous calls for states to reform
their health licensing regimes. For instance, in 1995, the Pew Health
Professions Commission released 10 recommendations for states to
reform their licensing requirements for health care providers, such as
standardizing entry-to-practice requirements, allowing “all professionals
to provide services to the full extent of their current knowledge,
training, experience and skills,” and “redesign[ing] health professional
boards and their functions to reflect the interdisciplinary and public
accountability demands of the changing health care delivery system.”231
In 2011, the Institute of Medicine published a report on the future of
nursing, which included a recommendation that states reform their
scope-of-practice regulations for APNs to enable them “to practice to
the full extent of their education and training.”232
The federal government has issued its own recommendations. In
2004, the FTC published a report on improving competition in health
care, which included a recommendation that states “broaden the
membership of state licensure boards” and “consider implementing
uniform licensing standards or reciprocity compacts to reduce barriers
to telemedicine and competition from out-of-state providers who wish

230. See generally Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1745 (describing
such shifting between perspectives as the “inside/outside fallacy,”
when “the theorist equivocates between the external standpoint of an
analyst . . . and the internal standpoint of an actor within the
system”).
231. FINOCCHIO ET AL., supra note 86, at ix.
232. INST. MED., supra note 110, at 9.
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to move in-state.”233 The FTC released a report specifically focused on
the regulation of APNs in 2014, which included a number of
recommendations for state legislators.234 In 2015, the Obama White
House issued a report on occupational licensing (including—but not
limited to—licensing requirements for health care providers), which
included a number of licensing “best practices” for states, including
“[a]llowing practitioners to offer services to the full extent of their
current competency, to ensure that all qualified workers are able to
offer services.”235
These recommendations likely contributed to reforms at the state
level. For instance, the Institute of Medicine report created momentum
for states to expand their scopes of practices for APNs.236 The Obama
Administration cited several states that proposed reforms in line with
its recommendations after the release of its report.237
Yet despite the release of numerous different recommendations
aimed at state policymakers over the years, many of the problems with
our licensing system that were identified long ago still exist today. Some
of the same critiques in the 2015 Obama White House Report (for
instance, that the system of state licensing hinders provider mobility
and that scope of practice restrictions are overly stringent) were
articulated twenty years earlier in the 1995 Pew Health Professions
Commission report,238 and those critiques in turn echo points made by
Benjamin Shimberg in the 1970s and 80s.239
2.

Federal Reform Proposals

Rather than calling on the states to reform their own licensing
regimes, others have taken a different approach, proposing instead that
the federal government preempt state health licensing regimes to make

233. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T JUSTICE, supra note 182, at 2225.
234. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 108, at 1.
235. WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
236. See DePillis, supra note 220 (noting that nurses’ arguments to expand
their scope-of-practice were “bolstered by a seminal report from the
National Academies of Science in 2010, which recommended that states
remove barriers to nurses practicing ‘to the full extent of their education
and training.’”).
237. Press Release - Fact Sheet: New Steps to Reduce Unnecessary Occupation
Licenses that are Limiting Worker Mobility and Reducing Wage, THE
WHITE HOUSE - OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, (June 17, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/17/factsheet-new-steps-reduce-unnecessary-occupation-licenses-are-limiting.
238. FINOCCHIO ET AL., supra note 86, at vi-vii.
239. See SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 15.
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our system more rational and uniform.240 Perhaps the most intuitive
proposal along these lines is to replace our current patchwork of
conflicting state licensing laws with a single system of federal licensure
for health care providers.241 There are compelling reasons to support a
system of federal licensure. Since education and training standards for
health care providers are largely standardized in the United States, it
is difficult to justify the discrepancies among state licensing regimes on
grounds of quality.242 At the same time, differences among state
requirements impede the adoption of telemedicine and make it more
difficult for health care providers to relocate or practice in multiple
states.243 Preempting state licensing laws and creating a single federal
licensing regime could improve access to health care through both of
these channels.244 Nevertheless, as far as I am aware, Congress has never
seriously considered replacing state licenses for health care providers
with a single federal licensing regime.
A more targeted proposal is for the federal government to
specifically preempt state licensing restrictions that prevent health care
providers from delivering services across state lines remotely through
telehealth. There are several ways that Congress could do this: it could
create a special federal license for telehealth; it could preempt state
restrictions on out-of-state providers delivering health care via
telehealth; or it could pass legislation specifying that the location where
a health care provider practices be considered to be where the provider
is located, rather than where the patient is located.245 Any of these
proposals would require preempting state law and would mean that
health care providers providing health care services remotely through
telemedicine would have to be licensed only in the state in which they
reside, and not necessarily the states in which their patients are located.
240. See, e.g., McLean, supra note 120, at 443.
241. See, e.g., Gavil & Koslov, supra note 211, at 195-196; McLean, supra
note 120, at 446; Safriet, Health Care Dollars, supra note 178, at 447.
242. See Kocher et al., supra note 126.
243. See supra Part II(b).
244. See Zilis, supra note 87, at 213-14.
245. For some proposals along these lines, see, for example, Jacobson & Selvin,
supra note 117, at 436; Rashid Bashshur, Telemedicine and State-Based
Licensure in the United States, Revisited, 14 TELEMEDICINE & E-HEALTH
310 (2008); Matak, supra note 120, at 233; Shirley Svorny, Svorny:
Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Won’t Help, CLARION LEDGER,
https://www.clarionledger.com/story/opinion/columnists/2016/02/26/s
vorny-interstate-medical-licensure-compact-wont-help/80998064/
(last
updated Feb. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Svorny, Interstate Compact]; Shirley
Svorny, Telemedicine Runs Into Crony Doctoring, WALL ST. J. (July 22,
2016, 6:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/telemedicine-runs-intocrony-doctoring-1469226979.
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This would remove one of the most important barriers to more
widespread adoption of telehealth.
There has been at least one attempt to preempt state licensing
restrictions on telehealth. In 1995, then-representative Ron Wyden
introduced—and later withdrew—an amendment to the bill that
became the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which would have
prohibited states from “directly or indirectly restrict[ing] interstate
commerce by prohibiting any licensed physician from conducting a
consultation with a licensed provider in another state using any
advanced telecommunications service.”246
Another option is for the federal government to preempt state
scope-of-practice laws that prevent health care providers from
practicing to the full extent of their competence and training. The 1993
Clinton health care plan included a provision stating that “[n]o State
may, through licensure or otherwise, restrict the practice of any class
of health professionals beyond what is justified by the skills and training
of such professionals.”247 This proposal presumably would have
preempted at least those state scope-of-practice restrictions that were
clearly unrelated to providers’ qualifications, such as site restrictions
that allow nurses and other providers to provide services in one location
but not in another. It also would have enabled plaintiffs to sue state
licensing boards or administrative agencies in federal court if their scope
of practice restrictions were not justified by substantive training
criteria.248
B.

The Need for Federal Intervention

One might reasonably argue that the states should be left to reform
their own licensure regimes, and question whether the federal
government needs to be involved in licensing at all. Licensing has
traditionally been controlled by the states, and “the core of our federal
system is the principle that the states should take the lead unless there
is a need for federal action.”249 Moreover, two of the standard

246. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong., (1st Sess. 1995). The proposal originally referred
to “licensed health care provider,” instead of “licensed physician.” U.S.
DEPT. OF COM., 105TH CONG., TELEMEDICINE REPORT TO CONGRESS
(1997), available at https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/reports/telemed/
cover.htm.
247. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. § 1161 (1994). See also
Ameringer, supra note 113, at 62.
248. See H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. § 1161 (1994).
249. Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 Yale L.J F. 1, 2 (2017), available at www.yalelawjournal.com/forum/federalismand-the-end-of-obamacare; Collin Roth & Will Flanders, How
Occupational Licensing Laws are Fencing People Out of Opportunity,
FORBES (Apr. 27, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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justifications for federal preemption, correcting for discrimination
against minority groups and compensating for states’ lack of fiscal
capacity, do not appear to justify federal intervention in occupational
licensing.250
First, licensing does not reflect any obvious political pathologies,
such as discrimination against minority groups. Although there are
reasons to think that our licensing system disproportionately harms
low-income individuals,251 the fact that a state policy is regressive has
not traditionally been treated as a sufficient basis for federal
intervention.252 Although scholars have historically argued that the
occupational licensing disproportionately disadvantages minority
groups,253 recent empirical scholarship finds that licensing might in fact
have important benefits for historically disadvantaged groups, such as
providing more accessible career pathways and helping to reduce
statistical discrimination.254
Nor can federal intervention be justified on the basis that states
lack the fiscal capacity to enact licensing reform.255 Although some
realspin/2017/04/27/how-occupational-licensing-laws-are-fencing-peopleout-of-opportunity/#4974d6ee113b.
250. Id.
251. See FURMAN, supra note 15, at 3 (“[L]icensing requirements can
exacerbate inequality by shifting resources to those who obtained licensed
jobs and away from those who cannot and reallocating rents from often
lower-income consumers to producers. This is especially problematic when
obtaining a license requires paying large upfront costs, including tuition
and lost wages from educational requirements, which many low-income
workers cannot afford”).
252. See Bagley, supra note 249, at 9.
253. See, e.g., Stuart Dorsey, Occupational Licensing and Minorities, 7 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 171, 174 (1983); ALAN L. SORKIN, HEALTH MANPOWER: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 78 (1977).
254. See Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. Chung, Occupational Licensing Reduces
Racial and Gender Wage Gaps: Evidence from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation 2 (HCEO Working Papers Ser. No. 2017-050,
2017); Marc T. Law & Mindy S. Marks, Effects of Occupational Licensing
Laws on Minorities: Evidence from the Progressive Era, 52 J.L. & ECON.
351, 352 (2009); Beth Redbird, The New Closed Shop? The Economic and
Structural Effects of Occupational Licensure, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 600
(2017). But see Benjamin Powell & Evgeny S. Vorotnikov, Was
Occupational Licensing Good for Minorities? A Critique of Marc Law
and Mindy Marks by Daniel B. Klein, 9 ECON. J. WATCH 210 (2012).
255. See Bagley, supra note 249, at 10 (arguing that a national solution to
health care reform was necessary in part because states lack the fiscal or
taxing capacity to expand health insurance coverage on their own); see
also Eric Lee & Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Positive Case for Centralization
in Healthcare Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 266 (2011).

341

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming
Occupational Licensing

licensing reforms (such as reciprocity agreements) that would allow
workers to forgo obtaining a license would require states to forgo some
revenue, they would not impose a substantial fiscal burden on states.256
In 2016, fees from occupational and business licenses together only
accounted for a little more than one percent of states’ total revenues on
average.257 Other licensing reforms (such as expanding nurses’ scopes of
practice) would not necessarily even require states to forgo licensing
fees.
Nevertheless, I argue that federal intervention is still necessary for
three reasons: First, states lack the incentives to engage in large-scale
experiments to reduce the burdens of their licensing systems. Second,
individual state’s licensing policies have externalities that affect the
United States labor market as a whole. Third, licensing presents
collective action problems that states cannot easily resolve on their own.
These reasons apply to occupational licensing generally, not just to
licensing requirements for health care providers. The following sections
examine each of these claims in more detail.
1.

Experimentation

One reason why federal intervention is necessary is that states lack
sufficient incentives to engage in large-scale experimentation with their
licensing regimes on their own. This might seem counterintuitive: one
of the classic justifications for state governance is that it encourages
experimentation and enables states to test policies on a smaller-scale
before adopting them nationwide.258 However, as scholars have shown,
states do not independently engage in as much regulatory
experimentation as policymakers would like.259 Scholars cite several
possible reasons for this relative lack of experimentation, including the
costs of developing regulatory innovations and the ability of other states
to “free ride” on successful innovations, and the fear of scaring off
businesses.260

256. Kleiner, Reforming Occupational Licensing Policies, supra note 14, at 18.
257. Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections (STC), U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, tbl. ‘2016 Annual Survey of State Government Tax Collections
Detailed Table (2016), available at https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/
tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk#.
258. Lee & Moncrieff, supra note 255, at 269-270 (“Experimentation—the
ability of states to act as laboratories of democracy—is probably the most
frequently invoked functional advantage of state governance.”) (citing
New Ice State Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
259. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1764-65.
260. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 28, at 567-568 (citing Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594, 615 (1980); Rubin & Feeley,
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As discussed, there are several forces preserving the status quo with
regard to licensing, including licensing’s public choice dynamics.261
Although states have been all too willing to “experiment” with imposing
idiosyncratic requirements to obtain a license, they have not been
nearly so willing to experiment with reforms that would ease the labor
market burdens of licensing or fundamentally alter the structure of their
licensing systems.262 Many of the problems that plague our licensing
system today stem from our licensing system’s original architecture: for
instance, Barbara Safriet describes the history of scope-of-practice laws
as “exerting a gravitational force that continues to skew all attempts
to modify non-physician scopes of practice.”263
One advantage of a federalist approach is that it can encourage
states to act more boldly than they would if left to their own devices.264
Some of the most important state policy innovations have come not
when states act on their own, but when they implement federal law.265
For example, the ACA itself was famously modeled on Governor
Romney’s health care reform plan in Massachusetts, but that plan in
turn was enabled by a Medicaid waiver from the Bush
Administration.266 Similarly, as shown in Part III, many of the limited
state experiments with licensing—such as the formation of interstate
compacts and the adoption of new supervision regimes for licensing
boards—are the result of federal prodding.267
A more ambitious federalist approach to licensing could incentivize
states to adopt bolder experiments, such as those that have been
adopted in Canada. In 1991, the Canadian province of Ontario enacted
legislation that transformed its licensing system for health care
providers from one much like that in the United States—a professionspecific licensing system with exclusive scopes of practice controlled by
supra note 29, at 925-926; David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2551-60 (2005)).
261. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
262. Larkin, supra note 75, at 222 (“One of the benefits of a federal system
is that states can explore different regulatory regimes. Yet some
differences are inexplicable. It is difficult to imagine a legitimate
justification for caring more about whether someone’s hair looks
‘marvelous’ than whether his heart can be restarted.”).
263. Safriet, Closing the Gap, supra note 100, at 308;
264. Gluck, [National] Federalism, supra note 28, at 2004-2005 (“[S]tate
experimentation . . . has arguably been better effectuated from states
implementing federal statutory schemes than from them acting alone”).
265. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1764-65;
Rubin & Feeley, supra note 29, at 925.
266. Id. at 1765.
267. See supra Part III.
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members of the licensed professions—to one common regulatory regime
for all health professions controlled in large part by public appointees.268
The law also established an advisory council, charged with continually
revisiting the regulatory regime and offering recommendations to
update it, including whether regulated professions should no longer be
regulated.269 A 2001 review of the Act—while noting various suggestions
for improvements—concluded that it brought about “a clear paradigm
shift in the manner and mode of health profession regulation in
Ontario,” and that “[t]he paradigm of profession-centered regulation
gave way to public interest regulation.”270
Canada has also implemented reforms to make licenses more
portable across provinces and improve workers’ mobility. In 2009, the
Canadian federal government and provincial and territorial
governments signed a free trade agreement which made it easier for
workers in regulated fields to move across provinces by requiring
provincial regulators to demonstrate why workers from other provinces
are not qualified to be licensed in their jurisdictions.271 Thereafter, the
provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan
went even further by establishing mutual recognition for a number of
different regulated professions.272 These reforms appear much more
wide-ranging and radical than the professional compacts that are being
adopted in the United States.
2.

Externalities

State policymakers also do not have incentives to take into account
the impacts of their own state’s occupational licensing regimes on
residents of other states. Each state’s licensure laws contributes to a
national system that impedes the adoption of new modes of service
delivery in fields such as health care and law that—if implemented—
could improve access to services across the United States.273 Yet state
268. Safriet, Closing the Gap, supra note 100, at 327-28.
269. About, HEALTH PROFESSIONS REGULATORY ADVISORY COUNCIL,
https://www.hprac.org/en/about/mandate.asp (last visited Sept. 26,
2017).
270. HEALTH PROFESSIONS REGULATORY ADVISORY COUNCIL, ADJUSTING THE
BALANCE: REVIEW OF THE REGULATED HEALTH PROFESSIONS ACT 17
(2001).
271. HADRIAN MERTINS-KIRKWOOD, LABOUR MOBILITY IN CANADA ISSUES AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS 7 (October
2014).
272. Professional
or
Skilled
Tradesperson,
NEW WEST P’SHIP,
http://www.newwestpartnershiptrade.ca/professional_or_skilled_trades
person.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
273. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access: Changing the Way
Courts Regulate Legal Markets, 143 DAEDALUS 83 (2015).
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policymakers only have incentives to take these developments into
account to the extent that they affect their own states’ residents. Nor
do state policymakers have incentives to take fully into account the
extent to which their licensing regimes affect health care spending, since
the federal government shoulders almost one-third of the nation’s
health care expenditures.274
In addition, states do not have incentives to consider the impacts
of their licensing systems on the U.S. labor market as a whole.
Economists have recently documented worrisome declines in various
indicators of “labor market fluidity” in recent decades, including the
proportion of workers changing jobs, getting a new job, or relocating
from one state to another.275 Reduced labor market fluidity in turn has
been linked to lower employment, especially for young and less educated
workers.276 Although it is unlikely that the growth of occupational
licensing is the primary driver of this reduced fluidity, economists have
hypothesized that it may be playing a contributing role by making it
harder for workers to move to another state or get a new job.277 State
legislatures and licensing boards do not have sufficient incentives to
consider these macroeconomic effects when deciding which professions
should be licensed and how their licensing rules should be structured,
nor should they be expected to do so.278

274. NHE Fact Sheet, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statisticstrends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2017); see also Moncrieff, supra note 180, at 847-848
(making an analogous argument in the context of medical malpractice).
275. See Raven Molloy et al., Understanding Declining Fluidity in the U.S.
Labor Market, BROOKINGS INST. (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/
bpea-articles/understanding-declining-fluidity-in-the-u-s-labor-market/;
Raven Molloy et al., Declining Migration within the U.S.: The Role of the
Labor Market, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 20065
(2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20065.pdf.
276. See Steven J. Davis & John Haltiwanger, Labor Market Fluidity and
Economic Performance, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 20479, 2014); See also, ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF
JOBS 154-177 (2012) (describing the disparity in mobility between more
and less educated Americans, and the economic consequences of less
educated Americans’ lack of mobility).
277. See WH REPORT, supra note 8, at 39, 40; Davis & Haltiwanger, supra
note 276, at 28; but see Raven Molloy et al., Job Changing and the Decline
in Long-Distance Migration in the United States, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 631,
649 (2017).
278. Schleicher, supra note 21, at 150 (“[T]he central problem is that state and
local policymakers do not have incentives to protect the broader national
labor market. Only federal policymakers can be expected to act on behalf
of such an interest”).

345

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming
Occupational Licensing
3.

Collective Action

The current system of state licensing also presents collective action
problems because it insulates in-state professionals from out-of-state
competition.279 Although state governments could in theory improve
access to health care for their citizens by unilaterally reducing their own
licensing barriers (for instance, by accepting out-of-state licenses or
allowing out-of-state providers to deliver services remotely without an
in-state license), doing so would increase competition for in-state
professionals while at the same time benefiting out-of-state providers.
This is similar to the dynamic in international trade that makes
countries unwilling to unilaterally reduce tariffs, even though doing so
would provide consumer benefits in the form of lower prices.280
A more plausible approach is for states to form bilateral or
multilateral arrangements that would benefit both in-state and out-ofstate professionals. Yet the transaction costs associated with forming
and maintaining such agreements render it unlikely that all 50 states
will be able voluntarily reach agreements that effectively address
licensing barriers to accessing care for the full range of health care
professions.281 As discussed, professional regulatory organizations and
states have already begun to form interstate compacts for a number of
health care professions.282 However, some of these agreements have only
279. Neil Siegel defines a “collective action problem” as “a situation in which
individually rational action by states leads to collectively irrational
results.” Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism and Its Discontents,
91 TEX. L. REV. 1937, 1941 (2013).
280. THOMAS OATLEY, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 80 (5th ed. 2012)
(“[T]he logic of collective action helps us understand why governments
rarely liberalize trade unilaterally, but have been willing to do so through
negotiated agreements. Reciprocal trade agreements make it easier for
export-oriented industries to overcome the collective action
problem . . . Reciprocal trade agreements provide large benefits in the
form of access to foreign markets to small groups of export-oriented
firms . . . . These . . . firms will solve the collective action problem they
face and lobby for trade liberalization at home in exchange for the removal
of foreign barriers to their exports”); see also Richard E. Levy, Federalism
and Collective Action, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1241, 1251 (1997) (“Although[]
a group of states is generally better off collectively if the members of the
group pursue free trade policies, from the perspective of individual states
there are strong incentives to behave in protectionist ways regardless of
what other members of the group do”).
281. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 32, at 139-44 (describing the transaction
costs entailed in forming voluntary interstate agreements). But see Aziz
Z. Huq, Does the Logic of Collective Action Explain Federalism
Doctrine?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 217, 220 (2014) (arguing that simply
identifying a collective action problem does not necessarily provide a
sufficient justification for federal intervention).
282. See supra Part III(b).
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come about after the federal government provided funding for them,
many of them are relatively limited in scope, and there is limited
empirical evidence as yet that any of them has achieved their goals,
such as improving mobility or increasing access to telehealth.283
C.

Federalism Versus Federal Preemption

Despite the intuitive appeal of federal preemption, a federalist
approach to occupational licensing reform is more feasible than outright
preemption. Interest group politics, as well as Congress’s reluctance to
preempt state law and its reliance on state administration, make it
unlikely that Congress will preempt large swaths of state occupational
licensing law. A federalist approach also has functional advantages:
preserving state variation allows for more experimentation than setting
one-size-fits-all standards at the federal level; and it enables the federal
government to take advantage of states’ institutional expertise in
regulating occupations.
1.

Interest Group Politics

Historically, professional associations and licensing boards—which,
as discussed above, exert outsized influence in maintaining the status
quo—have opposed federal preemption of state licensing laws.284 For
instance, medical associations and licensing boards opposed the Clinton
Administration’s proposal to limit state scope of practice restrictions
(one of the few occasions on which the federal government has seriously
considered preempting state licensing laws), “arguing that more
permissive practice laws would jeopardize the quality of care being
delivered and that the federal government would be encroaching into a
field of regulation more properly left to the states.”285 The American
Medical Association and medical licensing boards (and likely also state
legislatures) also oppose the idea of the federal government replacing
our current system with a system of federal licensure, creating a federal
license for telemedicine, or passing federal legislation that would
preempt state restrictions on telehealth.286 Opponents of federal
283. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
285. Mark R. Yessian & Joyce M. Greenleaf, The Ebb and Flow of Federal
Initiatives to Regulate Healthcare Professionals, in REGULATION OF
THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 185 (Timothy Jost, ed., 1992).
286. Zilis, supra note 87, at 214; Sulentic, supra note 122, at 37; AM. MED.
ASS’N, ISSUE BRIEF: INTERSTATE MEDICAL LICENSURE COMPACT (2017),
available
at
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/mediabrowser/specialty%20group/arc/fsmb-interstate-medical-licensurecompact-issue-brief.pdf (“Importantly, the [Interstate Medical Licensure]
Compact is the first line of defense against troubling federal proposals to
create a federal telemedicine license, or to change the site of practice from
where the patient is located to where the physician is located for purposes
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licensure argue that states are better able to ensure public safety,
though they may also be concerned about the loss of revenue that would
be associated with such a proposal.287 Even proponents of federal
preemption concede that such efforts would face strong headwinds from
interest groups.288
History suggests that a federalist approach may be more successful
at overcoming interest group opposition than simply trying to preempt
state licensing laws. In contrast to the federal preemption proposals
discussed above, the federal government has already demonstrated that
it is capable of implementing measures to encourage states to reform
their licensing systems while largely preserving states’ control over the
system.289
There are a few reasons why a federalist approach might be better
able to overcome interest group opposition. First, whereas preempting
state licensing laws would require Congress to upend our existing
system, a federalist approach would enable Congress to proceed in a
more incremental fashion and to rely more on administrative agencies.
As discussed above, federal agencies such as the Health Resources and
Services Administration, the FTC, and the VA already possess some
limited statutory authority over licensing. Congress could proceed by
of telemedicine, proposals which actually would usurp state authority to
regulate the practice of medicine. The Compact is intended to prevent
just that.”). By comparison, the American Nurses Association has taken
a somewhat more open-minded attitude, though it still seems skeptical of
federal licensing. Congress on Nursing Practice and Economic Licensure
Portability Workgroup, Nursing Licensure Portability: Options and
Information for Registered Nurses, NURSING WORLD (Apr. 2013),
https://www.nursingworld.org/~4af045/globalassets/docs/ana/ethics/lic
ensure-issue-brief-07-08-13.pdf (“In theory, the national and federal
models would eliminate the barriers to practice across state lines,
facilitating RN mobility and the provision of telehealth services. These
models, however, warrant further examination given the dramatic change
and untested ground they pose”).
287. Zilis, supra note 87, at 214-15.
288. See, e.g., Gavil & Koslov, supra note 211, at 195-196 (“Our most
provocative suggestion is to consider national licensure for health care
professionals, to insulate the licensure process from state-level politics and
mitigate the effects of silo-based turf battles that must be fought
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction . . . . We recognize, however, that states rely
on licensure fees as a source of revenue, which likely would skew states’
financial incentives to cede their licensing authority, and Congress might
be reluctant to preempt long-standing state authority.”); Edward H.
Forgotson & John L. Cook, Innovations and Experiments in Uses of
Health Manpower: The Effect of Licensure Laws, 32 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 731, 746 (1967) (“A federal program [of licensure], if it were
feasible, would be the most expeditious means of reform. However,
political realism makes this course seem unpromising at this time”).
289. See supra Part III.
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building on this authority, for example by appropriating additional
funds for states interested in implementing larger-scale reforms. Relying
on agencies to implement this approach would have the additional
advantage of helping to insulate it from interest group opposition. As
Steven Croley has persuasively argued, administrative procedures such
as notice-and-comment rulemaking and judicial review serve to bolster
agencies’ autonomy and level the playing field for less well-resourced
interest groups to compete with better-resourced ones, thus rendering
agencies less susceptible to interest group influence than Congress.290
Second, measures that indirectly affect licensing such as expanding
health insurance, enacting delivery system reforms, or providing
support for new health care delivery technologies would likely be
supported by a much wider and more powerful coalition of interest
groups since they intersect with many other issues besides licensing.291
Finally, depending on how it is designed, a more incremental
federalist approach may attract less intense opposition from interest
groups. For example, regulatory associations for nurses and physicians
have proven willing to accept federal funding to form interstate
compacts, and have even been supportive of some of these initiatives.292
That is not to say, however, that licensing boards and professional
associations would necessarily support a federalist approach to licensing
reform. For instance, in 1994, then-Representative Ron Wyden
proposed an amendment to the Clinton Health Security Act that would
290. STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY
OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 135-142 (2008); Steven P. Croley,
Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 38 (2000). That is
not to go so far as to say that agencies are not susceptible to interest
group influence at all, nor that agency procedures have succeeded in
completely leveling the playing field. To the contrary, there is a large
body of empirical literature in law and political science that finds that
business interests participate more and exert more influence in the
rulemaking process relative to other types of interest groups. See generally
Gabriel Scheffler, Failure to Capture: Why Business Does Not Control the
Rulemaking Process, 79 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
291. See Khan, supra note 208, at 127 (“[G]oing forward, the [California
Medical Association] and other physician interest groups will likely find
that nurse practitioners and other providers will have strong political and
financial support to redraft licensing and scope of practice laws from
information technology (IT) giants such as Apple, Google, Samsung,
Facebook, and IBM. Further, from the perspective of physician
organizations, this looming legislative battle might not be a fair fight.”).
See generally Wansley, supra note 225.
292. But see Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for
Federalism and Health Care, 28 CONN L. REV. 115, 126 (1995) (“Interest
group opposition can be overcome in American politics, but this sort of
success normally involves a moral crusade that leads in the direction of
uniform rights for all citizens. The need for national uniformity, however,
is exactly what federalist solutions deny.”).
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have established federal grants for state medical licensing boards
contingent on their meeting new federal performance standards.293 Even
though this proposal was relatively deferential to state licensing boards,
it was still met with suspicion from the state licensing boards and health
care professions.294 Still, the initiatives described in Section III suggest
that a federalist approach will be more likely to overcome these
challenges.
2.

Incrementalism and State Administration

Another obstacle in the path of preempting state licensing laws is
that Congress has historically proven unwilling to repeal important
areas of state regulation wholesale, especially in health care.295 Although
most scholars who have examined the issue have concluded that
Congress possesses the Constitutional authority to preempt state
licensing laws,296 Congress has historically taken a narrower
interpretation of its own constitutional authority to legislate on health
care issues, dating back to the earliest days of the Republic.297 After
293. Yessian & Greenleaf, supra note 285, at 185.
294. Id. at 170.
295. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1762 (“[O]ne
is hard-pressed to identify any examples of major social policy legislation
in which Congress wiped the slate clean of all preexisting state structures
and enacted comprehensive, federal-only reform in a single legislative
effort.”).
296. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gilman, Physician Licensure and Telemedicine: Some
Competitive Issues Raised by the Prospect of Practicing Globally While
Regulating Locally, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 87, 115 (2011)
(“[L]icensing is an area traditionally ceded to the states. That is likely a
political problem more than a constitutional one.”); Hoffman & Rowthorn,
supra note 117, at 15 (“A national licensure system may raise Tenth
Amendment concerns . . . [H]owever, arguments that the current state
based system constrains interstate commerce could counter such concerns,
especially if the license is limited to telemedicine.”); Nicole Huberfeld, Be
Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate Practice of
Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 243, 288 (2004) (“Despite the
jurisprudential inconsistencies, a reasonable conclusion can be reached
that Congress would have the power under the Commerce Clause, despite
federalism concerns, to legislate in the field of the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine.”); Safriet, Impediments, supra note 96, at 311 (“Let
me emphasize that, while people are often confused on this point, statebased licensure is not a constitutional imperative. It is simply a
tradition”).
297. See Theodore W. Ruger, Plural Constitutionalism and the Pathologies of
American Health Care, 120 YALE L.J. 347, 354 (2011) (“[M]embers of
Congress in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued to
hold a limited conception of their own authority over health matters, both
expressly in floor debates and implicitly in their failure to act.”);
Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged
Constitution of American Healthcare, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215,

350

Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019
Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to Reforming
Occupational Licensing

reviewing various federal initiatives to reform health workforce
regulation, Yessian and Greenleaf conclude that “the great majority of
federal initiatives proposed to regulate healthcare professionals” have
been felled by “the federal government’s deep-seated bias toward
inaction.”298
Instead, when Congress does legislate on social policy, it tends to
do so incrementally and to actively rely on states to administer new
federal programs.299 For example, the structure of the ACA relies
heavily on states to interpret and administer the law.300 Abbe Gluck
cites a few factors that contribute to Congress’s tendency toward
incrementalism and state administration: a respect for states’ authority
in areas where they have historically held regulatory authority; the
difficulty of achieving consensus in Congress; a lack of knowledge about
the best policy solution and a desire to test policies on a smaller-scale
before adopting them nationwide; and a reliance on states’ expertise in
administering new federal programs.301
A federalist approach has political advantages over outright federal
preemption that might render it more successful at overcoming these
reservations. Gluck ventures that an approach that largely preserves
states’ authority over licensing might “assuage concerns of legislators
who are suspicious of, or politically opposed to, the current executive
branch’s policy agenda” since members of Congress are more likely to
trust their own state government officials.302 By keeping the federal role
vague, this approach might also “be more politically palatable to those
229 (2012) [hereinafter Ruger, Icebergs] (“From the late eighteenth
century onward, Congress evidenced a consistent trend of legislating
on healthcare topics with less than what others within and outside of
government thought its full Commerce Clause authority would permit.
In so doing, Congress appears to have been acting on a perception of
its own power in this area that was more cramped than that shared
by other branches”).
298. Yessian & Greenleaf, supra note 285, at 186.
299. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1761-63;
Ruger, Icebergs, supra note 297, at 233-34.
300. See Allison K. Hoffman, What Health Reform Reveals about Health Law,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 49, 60 (I. Glenn Cohen,
Allison K. Hoffman, and William M. Sage eds., 2017) (“Both the
establishment of the exchanges and the Medicaid expansion rely on state
administrators to give content to the ACA’s broad strokes by interpreting
and implementing the law . . . . The fact that two of the most important
policies of the ACA rely on state-level implementation reflects both a
history of shared governance in health regulation and also Congress’s
opinion (at least in the Senate) that this federalist norm was important
to preserve.”).
301. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1761-64.
302. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 28, at 573.
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who generally resist federal aggrandizement or prefer ‘smaller’
government or local variation,” and it might prove to be less of an
affront to those who think the states should continue to control
licensing.303
Preserving state variation in licensing policy would also address the
concern that Congress doesn’t have enough information to enact the
optimal licensing reform.304 Although proponents of federal preemption
may object that such an approach is slower and less efficient than
having Congress step in and set federal standards,305 the potential
downside of having the federal government pick certain standards and
apply them nationwide is also bigger, since there is no guarantee that
the federal government will set the optimal standards.306 For instance,
if the federal government were to adopt federal scope-of practice
standards, it could actually reduce access to care to the extent that the
federal scope-of-practice standards were set to match the strictest state
requirements.307
Finally, a federalist approach would enable the federal government
to take advantage of states’ institutional experience in regulating
occupations, and to avoid having to create an equivalent institutional
apparatus at the federal level. Daniel Gilman, an Attorney Advisor at
the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning, notes that there is currently no
federal agency “with the authority, expertise, and experience to perform
the various licensing functions undertaken by the states, and it would
be difficult to create one.”308 He acknowledges that this challenge is not
insurmountable: there is plenty of expertise about occupational
regulation in the federal government, at agencies like the Department
of Labor, HRSA, and the FTC. But some federal preemption proposals,
such as creating a federal system of licensure, would necessitate creating

303. Id. at 572-573.
304. Vaheesan & Pasquale, supra note 15, at 4 (“We believe that critics should
demonstrate a Burkean humility before upsetting arrangements that have
long governed these fields”).
305. Svorny, Interstate Compact, supra note 245
306. Safriet, Federal Options, supra note 98, at 467 (describing the advantages
and disadvantages of federal licensure, including “the likelihood that the
very same forces that have prevailed in many states would succeed in
bringing about a similar result at the national level—that is, in making
sure that national standards would embody the most restrictive, rather
than the most progressive and empowering, scope-of-practice provisions,
thus actually making the situation worse in those states that currently
pursue a more enlightened approach”).
307. Id.
308. Gilman, supra note 296, at 91.
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an accompanying set of institutions capable of issuing, updating, and
enforcing federal occupational licensing laws.309
* * *
All this is not to say that there is no role for federal preemption,
nor that federal preemption is necessarily incompatible with a federalist
approach. In fact, traditional cooperative federalist regimes have often
made use of the threat of federal preemption: offering states the option
of administering a certain program or having the federal government
administer it.310 Simply maintaining the generalized threat of federal
preemption may provide additional impetus for states to reform their
licensing regimes.311 In addition, as outlined above, a “field-claiming”
approach, in which the federal government makes a small series of
encroachments onto state territory, may represent a realistic path. Yet
reformers would be better served by viewing preemption as one of
several tools that can be used to prod the states into reforming their
licensing regimes, rather than as an immediate or exclusive solution.

V. Conclusion
This article presents a model for how the federal government can
encourage states to reform the current system of occupational licensing
for health care providers, and argues that such an approach would be
more viable than either leaving licensing to the states or advocating for
outright federal preemption. Although this paper focuses primarily on
occupational licensing in health care, it also suggests that a federalist
model could be used to change the licensing systems governing other
fields as well.312
309. Id. at 115-16. See also WAKEFIELD, supra note 125, at 11 (“[G]iven the
difficulties associated with central administration and enforcement, the
states might play a role in implementation [of Federal Licensure]”).
310. See Evan Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of
Federal Law, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1997) (“Congress frequently
encourages states to become regulatory partners in federal programs,
sometimes by threatening to preempt the existing regulations of nonparticipating states, and other times by rewarding participating states
with substantial monetary subsidies”).
311. See, e.g., Chaudhry et al., supra note 174, at 1582 (“[T]here has been
concern among state boards that failure to generate a state-based
approach to license portability could embolden supporters of a federal
solution, such as national licensure, that might compromise states’ rights
under the 10th Amendment and undo the patient-safety provisions (such
as a state’s ability to investigate patient complaints locally) that are built
into each state’s medical regulatory structures”).
312. See supra notes 224-227 and accompanying text.
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Of course, that is not to say that affecting widespread change in
our licensing system will be easy or quick. The licensing system in the
United States has proven remarkably intractable since its inception,
and any change will likely have to be incremental. Nearly half a century
ago, in their study of occupational licensing, Benjamin Shimberg,
Barbara F. Esser, and Daniel H. Kruger sketched out some of the
challenges entailed in reforming the licensing system:
[T]he whole institution of occupational licensing is embedded in
a morass of federal, state, and local legislation suffused with
tradition, custom, and jealously guarded rights. There are clearly
no simple solutions. To bring about change would involve not
only modifications of hundreds of state laws and local ordinances
but also negotiations among dozens of occupational interest
groups that have, over the years, managed to achieve some sort
of delicate balance within the existing structure. The possibility
of change, even relatively minor change, is likely to be perceived
as a threat by those who gain not only prestige but also tangible
economic benefits from the existing structure. Anyone
contemplating change must consider not only its operational
aspects, such as amending existing legislation or modifying
procedures, but also its psychological aspects—the way people
perceive or respond to the proposed changes. It is probably best
to think of modifications in licensing as an ongoing process—a
spiral moving upward from one level to the next—that will not
necessarily be accomplished in one, two, or even five years.313

Despite the promise of recent developments and the resurgence of
interest in licensing, this cautionary advice seems just as applicable
today. Any large-scale change will require a strong and sustained
commitment on behalf of the federal government, and will likely take
place over a long period of time.
Nevertheless, this article provides some reasons for optimism. It
shows that the federal government has a range of tools at its disposal
to encourage states to reform their licensing regimes, that it has already
taken some initial steps to encourage states to restructure their licensing
requirements for health care providers specifically, and that even these
limited measures have had tangible impacts on states’ licensing regimes
and in turn have the potential to improve access to health care.
This lesson is especially important today, as there is a growing
appreciation of the important consequences that state and local
regulations have for national issues such as health care, the labor
market, and geographic mobility. Many scholars and policymakers
grappling with these interactions have continued to view state and local
regulatory policy through a dual federalist framework: either advocating
313. SHIMBERG ET AL., supra note 12, at 210.
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for states to reform their own regulations, or alternatively, calling for
large-scale federal preemption. By contrast, this article shows that at
least in some contexts, a federalist solution may be the most realistic
and normatively desirable solution, and that there is promising
precedent for such an approach.
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